

Don Zimmerman,
Plaintiff,

vs.

**Austin Investigative Reporting Project
d/b/a The Austin Bulldog, and Ken
Martin;**
Defendants.

In the 53rd District Court
Travis County, Texas

**Response to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and
Request for Limited Discovery**

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

Now Comes Donald Zimmerman ("Zimmerman"), and files this response to Defendant's motion to dismiss and a request for limited discovery.

Background of Action

Introduction

This action arose from a narrow defamatory attack against Don Zimmerman in which Defendants, in both an email teaser and a public webpage, falsely stated that a medical doctor had expressly concluded Zimmerman abused his estranged daughter.

Zimmerman is defamed and mails retraction letter

Pursuant to the Texas Defamation Mitigation Act, Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code § 73.055, Zimmerman mailed a retraction request to Defendants requesting the email and webpage clarify that the doctor did not state that Zimmerman had actually abused his daughter, as the doctor lacked personal knowledge of any such fact, but merely paraphrased hearsay allegations by others. Zimmerman even provided, free of charge to the website, a transcript of the child's counselor who testified that the daughter was manipulating the situation against Zimmerman. Instead of attempting to find the truth of the matter, Defendants, in an irresponsible attempt to gin up a phony election year "scandal," Defendants did not alter the

false and defamatory statement, but instead exploited the “controversy” in an attempt to gain sympathetic media coverage for its classless and inaccurate distortion of a years-old family law matter concerning a city council candidate.

Defendants did not retract or clarify that false and defamatory statement. Family law cases can become very heated, and the difference between a doctor’s statement based on personal knowledge, or an alienated child’s hearsay, is vast.

Zimmerman files suit but does not serve Defendants.

Zimmerman then exercised his right under Texas common law to file a suit for defamation on October 15, 2014. After filing suit, Zimmerman did not serve Defendants, spending his time deeply involved in his goal of representing the citizens of Austin, District 6 (a position for Austin City Council that was won on December 16, 2014). Defendants, eager to engage in a high publicity court battle to accomplish their political goals against Zimmerman and their crass business goals of increasing their advertising rates based on increased viewers, filed an answer and motion to dismiss on their own volition prior ever to being served with process. Despite having never been served, Defendants threatened Zimmerman with the filing of the motion and the attendant fees to get him to dismiss the lawsuit prior to the election in order to generate more controversy and more media attention and more revenue.

Zimmerman’s first action as City Councilmember-elect is to file a nonsuit.

Zimmerman, on December 16, 2014, nonsuited his case because (1) no counterclaim had been filed; and (2) thus, no independent claim for affirmative relief existed; (3) discovery had not been conducted; (4) thus, very minimal reasonable fees should have been incurred in Defendants jumping into the suit prior to being served; (5) the case law in existence turned on *independent statutory counterclaims* and *independent motions for sanctions* relief outside of other types of motions (i.e., motions for summary judgment, motions to dismiss), and (6) having won the election,

Zimmerman’s damages were going to be markedly less than they would have been if the aim of Defendants’ defamation—to harm a political candidate whose views they opposed—had succeeded.

Outline of Response

- 1. Plaintiff has clear and specific evidence of defamation that overcomes the very low burden of the motion to dismiss.***
- 2. The matter involved malice, which can be ascertained with limited discovery.***
- 3. Defendants incurred unreasonable fees by appearing prior to being served based on their desire to generate media controversy and revenue, which should not be rewarded.***
- 4. The matter is an old legal matter not privileged under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code § 73.002(a).***
- 5. Defendants had no independent motion for sanctions; thus, the nonsuit should end this case.***

Table of Authorities

Cases

<i>Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers</i> , 674 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1984).....	6
<i>Neely v. Wilson</i> , 418 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2013)	4, 5
<i>Nobles v. Eastland</i> , 678 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984).....	6
<i>Padilla v. NCJ Dev., Inc.</i> , 218 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007)	7
<i>Rehak Creative Servs. v. Witt</i> , 404 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013)	5

Statutes

TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICES & REMEDIES CODE § 27	4
--	---

Texas Bar CLE Articles

Mark C. Walker, *Motions to Dismiss—Texas Anti-SLAPP Law: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ch. 27*;

State Bar of Texas “ULTIMATE MOTIONS PRACTICE” CLE, September 20, 2013..... 4

Grounds to Deny Motion to Dismiss

1. *Plaintiff has clear and specific evidence of defamation that overcomes the very low burden of the motion to dismiss.*

The burden of proof for motions to dismiss involves shifting burdens. Initially, Defendants must file a motion which alleges that the action “relates to” the parties’ “speech” on a “matter of public concern.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003 (“relates,” “speech”); 27.001 (“matter of public concern”). While “matter of public concern” is disputed, *see* “4.” *infra*, for purposes of this section’s explanation it is assumed. With that assumption, this burden has been met. *See* Def’s MTD at 5.

Next, the burden shifts for Zimmerman to show by “clear and specific” that he has a “prima facie” case for defamation. This is very plainly not the “clear and convincing” standard of proof, but a lesser burden that requires Zimmerman to show a specific quantum of evidence for each element of the defamation.¹ *See* Mark C. Walker, *Motions to Dismiss—Texas Anti-SLAPP Law: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ch. 27*, at 12; State Bar of Texas “ULTIMATE MOTIONS PRACTICE” CLE, September 20, 2013. (A courtesy copy is attached as Exhibit 1).

Zimmerman has those elements, which means he prevails against the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the elements² are:

1. Defendants published a statement of fact.
2. The statement referred to the Plaintiff.

¹ As Mr. Walker has argued, if “clear and specific” is more than “preponderance of the evidence” this may run afoul of the Texas Open Courts provision in Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution by absurdly requiring more proof to begin a case than is required to prevail on final judgment. *See* Walker, *Motions to Dismiss—Texas Anti-SLAPP Law: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ch. 27*, at 14-15.

² *See Neely v. Wilson*, 418 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2013).

3. The statement was defamatory (false).
4. With regard to the truth of the statement, the defendant was (a) acting with malice, (b) negligent, or (c) strictly liable—per se defamation.
5. The plaintiff suffered injury.

Even if the publication of the statements was correct in the details (which yours was not) but ***juxtaposed facts in a misleading way, the publication is still false.***³

—Elements 1, 2, & 3: Defendants published a statement of fact, referred to the Plaintiff, and the statement was false.

The email and blog both state *that the doctor reports literally state* that Mr. Zimmerman “on separate occasions” “inflicted bruises, pulled Marina’s hair, pushed her, and ‘threatened to kill her.’” This is a false statement. At no point does the blog or email express that these are allegations, that they are hearsay by the doctor, and the email and blog fail to identify or follow up on the outcome of a CPS investigation, if any. This leads the ordinary, reasonable person to believe that the doctor actually confirmed abuse when it was only hearsay.

—Element 4: With regard to the truth of the statement, the Defendants were (a) acting with malice, (b) negligent.

Defendants are alleged to have acted with malice. Section “2,” *infra*, will address this element. Importantly, discovery has been automatically stayed until this point, and may be permitted in this instance upon hearing of the motion to dismiss.

—Element 5: The Plaintiff suffered injury.

Zimmerman has without question suffered injury, and he will present direct testimony, as well as the attached affidavit testimony, that his reputation has been harmed.

Zimmerman has met allegations of his prima facie case provided that this Court permit limited discovery. “[A] prima facie case is one that will entitle a party to recover if no evidence to

³ *Id.* at 64.

the contrary is offered by the opposite party.” *Rehak Creative Servs. v. Witt*, 404 S.W.3d 716, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013). This is the “minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true.” *Id.*

This Court should permit limited discovery and conclude, after having permitted such discovery, that the motion to dismiss should be denied.

2. *To demonstrate malice, a required element for a medial defendant, discovery must be permitted.*

To prove defamation with a media defendant, malice or reckless is a required element. *See Nobles v. Eastland*, 678 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984) (citing to *Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers*, 674 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1984)). In order to demonstrate this fact, Plaintiff requests limited discovery. This discovery would be electronic in nature, and resolve itself upon the production of any document containing the following narrow, limited, key words:

“Zimmerman,” “Marina,” “Kateryna,” or “Bochenkova.” The discovery would also be narrowly limited in time, with the name “Zimmerman” being for the last 2 years, but the terms “Marina,” “Kateryna,” or “Bochenkova” limited in time from the date Zimmerman filed a campaign treasurer designation, which was on June 21, 2014.

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to have amassed by the time of filing suit all evidence necessary to prevail at trial, and to deny this limited, narrow request would be to close the courthouse door on all defamation claimants where discovery provides the only tool to show malice when it is contained in documents in the hands of opposing parties. This Court should permit limited discovery as requested.

3. *Defendants incurred unreasonable fees by appearing prior to being served based on their desire to generate media controversy and revenue, which should not be rewarded.*

Defendants have offered to this Court that they have incurred approximately \$22,000.00 in attorney's fees. This is patently unreasonable for several reasons. First, Defendants have a responsibility to mitigate damages, including attorneys' fees, which here are unreasonable.

A trial court determines the reasonableness of an attorney's fee award by considering the factors enumerated in *Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp.*, 945 S.W.2d 812, 818, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 591 (Tex. 1997). These non-exclusive factors are: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Padilla v. NCJ Dev., Inc., 218 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007) (finding that \$5,000.00 in pre-trial fees was reasonable).

Here, several factors weigh against this alleged amount of fees. First, under Factor (1), the Defendants had never been served with the suit. They answered of their own accord, and thus any “quick timing” complaints (holidays, fast schedule, need to find an attorney) does not hold water. Defendants may never have been served had they not filed an answer as no “clock” had begun to run.

Further, on several occasions work which does not require the skill of an attorney is billed at the attorney rate. These time entries include actions which were likely done by a paralegal, such as “ordering certified copies of records,” which occurs two entries before “obtaining certified copy of divorce decree.” This is redundant “non-attorney” work. Similarly, on three separate occasions the “exhibits” are “assembled” or “organized.” This is redundant, “non-attorney” work.

Second, the amount in controversy had never been established, and the case was non-suited prior to any hearing. Thus, Factor 4 weighs against an award of \$22,000.00.

Third, the only items filed in this case were an answer and a motion to dismiss, along with the first hearing. This certainly amounts to about \$4,000.00 to \$5,000.00 worth of work, if that, rather than \$22,000.00 ***even prior to a hearing on the case.***

Fourth, opposing counsel suggests that drafting the motion to dismiss took 43.5 hours. This is wholly unreasonable. The affidavit identifies the motion by several different monikers, which sometimes is “motion to dismiss,” and at other times “anti-SLAPP motion.”

This Court should not award a grossly excessive amount of attorney’s fees on this case as requested by Defendants.

Prayer for Relief

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants and deny the claim for attorney’s fees. Alternatively, this Court should permit limited discovery of the items requested, *supra*. The Court should also reduce the award of attorney’s fees.

Respectfully submitted,

CASEY LAW OFFICE, P.C.

/s/ Stephen Casey
Stephen Casey
Texas Bar No. 24065015

600 Round Rock West Drive, Suite 602
Round Rock, Texas 78681
Telephone: 512-257-1324
Fax: 512-853-4098

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this response and the attached article and affidavit were served upon Defendants by the manner and method indicated below on this day, June 11, 2014.

Via email and or electronic service

/s/ Stephen Casey
Stephen Casey; *Counsel for Plaintiff*

**MOTIONS TO DISMISS – TEXAS ANTI-SLAPP LAW:
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE CH. 27**

MARK C. WALKER

Cox Smith Matthews, Inc.
221 N. Kansas, Suite 2000

El Paso, Texas 79901

mwalker@coxsmith.com

Ph: (915) 541-9300 Fax: (915) 541-9399

State Bar of Texas

ULTIMATE MOTIONS PRACTICE

September 20, 2013

Austin

CHAPTER 5

Mark C. Walker

Cox Smith Matthews
221 N. Kansas, Ste. 2000
El Paso, Texas 79901
915-541-9322(Direct)
mwalker@coxsmith.com
<http://www.coxsmith.com/People/MarkCWalker>

Mark Walker is a shareholder in the Cox Smith Matthews firm and heads the El Paso office. A 1981 Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Texas with majors in history and geology, Mark survived graduate school at UT while studying legal history and natural resource management and engineering. After graduating from UT Law School in 1985, Mark has over twenty-five years of trial, appellate, and administrative hearing experience, and helping clients resolve complex legal issues. Mark has extensive experience resolving a broad array of business, commercial, product liability, tort and negligence cases, and insurance defense litigation. Over the last several years Mark has been specializing in "weird law," including election and campaign finance law matters, such as representation of El Paso's mayor against an illegal recall election campaign and assisting companies and candidates with compliance issues. He has taken regional leadership roles in complex litigation. Mark continues to be recognized by his peers as a "Texas Super Lawyer" in civil litigation defense and by *The Best Lawyers in America* in personal injury defense. Mark is a member of the American Board of Trial Advocates, the Defense Research Institute, is a Vice President of the Texas Association of Defense Counsel, and is past chair of the District 17A Grievance Committee. He has been Board Certified in Personal Injury Trial Law for over twenty years, and served six years on the examination commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, ending in 2012. In addition to being a frequent speaker at state and national litigation conferences, Mark has been active in several El Paso community organizations. When not at the office or organization, Mark can often be found fly fishing in cold waters.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	ii
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. THE TEXAS CITIZENS PARTICIPATION ACT: WHAT IS IT?	1
A. Background and Enactment of the TCPA.	1
1. What is a SLAPP lawsuit?.....	1
2. Stated Purpose: Prevent Frivolous Suits.....	2
3. Underlying Purpose: Protection of Media Defendants.....	3
4. The 2013 Amendments: Still Media-Driven.	5
III. APPLICATION OF THE TCPA.	7
A. What Claims are Covered?.....	7
B. Exceptions to the TCPA.	8
C. Procedure.....	9
1. A New Form of Dispositive Motion.....	9
2. Deadline to File the Motion.....	9
3. Deadline for Hearing and Decision: “Set,” “Rule,” and Continuances.	9
4. Discovery Stay – for “Good Cause.”	11
D. Standards and Burdens of Proof/Actions by Court.	12
1. What Evidence May be Considered?.....	12
2. Burden of Proof on the Movant.	12
3. Burden of Proof on the Respondent.....	12
4. Affirmative Defenses Are Now Considered.....	16
5. Ruling by the Court – Dismissal Mandatory.	17
E. Mandatory, Not Discretionary, Award of Fees and Sanctions for Movant Upon Dismissal of Legal Action.	18
F. Award of Fees, Not Sanctions, for Respondent/Plaintiff – Predicated on Frivolous Motion.....	18
G. Appellate Review.	18
1. Interlocutory Appeal: What is Reviewable?.....	18
2. Motion to Dismiss Timely Granted -.....	22
3. Deadlines for Chapter 27 Appeal or Writ.....	23
4. Any Appeal or Writ From An Order On A Chapter 27 Motion to Dismiss Shall be Expedited.	23
5. Standard of Review of Interlocutory Appeal.....	23
H. Does the TCPA Apply in Federal Court?.....	25
I. Does the Act Conflict with the Supreme Court’s Rule-Making Authority?	26
J. Does the Statute Conflict With Texas’ Constitutional Protection of Rights to Sue for Reputational Torts?	27
IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES.	28
A. Overbroad Application and Chilling Effect on Meritorious Business Tort Actions.	28
B. Justice Delayed is Justice Denied.....	29
C. When The Texas Attorney General Must Be Invited to the Party.....	29
V. THE TCPA – CONCLUSIONS DRAWN.....	30
VI. THE “MULLIGAN BILL”: THE TEXAS DEFAMATION MITIGATION ACT.	30
A. Legislative History.	30
B. Application of the Defamation Mitigation Act: Prerequisites to Filing Defamation Suit, Request and Response, Abatement.	31
C. Limitations of Damages.	32
D. Harmonizing (or Conflicting) With Texas Citizens Participation Act.....	32

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
CASES	
<i>3M Co. v. Boulter</i> , 842 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. D.C. 2012),.....	37
<i>3M Co. v. Boulter</i> , 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40789 (D. D.C. March 22, 2013)(<i>Boulter II</i>)	37, 38
<i>ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin</i> , 943 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1997)	22
<i>Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc.</i> , 322 U.S. 607 (1944)	35
<i>Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson</i> , 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2006)	35
<i>Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc.</i> , 297 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. 2009)	22
<i>Ascend Health Corp. v. Wells</i> , 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35237 (E. D. N.C. March 14, 2013)	38
<i>Avila and Univision v. Larrea</i> , 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2012, pet. filed)	passim
<i>Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly</i> , 550 U.S. 544 (2007)	38
<i>Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dallas, Inc. v. BH DFW, Inc.</i> , 402 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2013, no pet. h.)	13, 30
<i>Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dallas, Inc. v. Ward</i> , 401 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2013, no pet. h.)	13
<i>Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Services</i> , No. 01-12-00990-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 (12-13 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] July 16, 2013, no pet. h.)	passim
<i>Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals</i> , 795 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1990)	31, 32
<i>Brandenburg v. Ohio</i> , 395 U.S. 444 (1969)	10
<i>Carr v. Brasher</i> , 776 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1989)	22
<i>Casso v. Brand</i> , 776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1989)	40
<i>Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire</i> , 315 U.S. 568 (1942)	10
<i>City of Austin v. Whittington</i> , 384 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2012)	27, 28
<i>City of Keller v. Wilson</i> , 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005)	32, 36
<i>CLT/Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n</i> , 390 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2013)	25
<i>CMH Homes v. Perez</i> , 340 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2011)	29, 30
<i>Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue</i> , 271 S.W.3d 238 (Tex. 2008)	36
<i>Cook v. Tom Brown Ministries, et al.</i> , 385 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2012, pet. denied)	1, 31
<i>Coward v. Gateway Nat’l Bank</i> , 525 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1975)	21
<i>Crawford-El v. Britton</i> , 523 U.S. 574 (1998)	38

<i>Croucher v. Croucher</i> , 660 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1983)	36
<i>Direct Commercial Funding, Inc. v. Beacon Hill Estates</i> , No. 14-12-00896-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1898 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 th Dist.] January 24, 2013, no pet. h.).....	3, 30, 32, 33
<i>Dodson v. Bunton</i> , 81 Tex. 655, 17 S.W. 507 (Tex. 1891)	35
<i>Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers</i> , 282 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. 2009)	34, 35
<i>Epps v. Fowler</i> , 351 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011)	25
<i>Ex parte Tucci</i> , 859 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993) (Phillips, C.J., concurring)	40
<i>Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Systems</i> , 996 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1999)	35
<i>Fleming Foods of Tex. v. Rylander</i> , 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 1999)	35
<i>Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc.</i> , 124 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. 2003)	20, 22
<i>Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgeway</i> , 135 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2004)	20
<i>Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors Inc.</i> , 960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998)	22
<i>Godin v. Schencks</i> , 629 F.3d 79 (1 st Cir. 2010)	37
<i>Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson</i> , 113 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003)	36
<i>Goodman v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Reg.</i> , 430 F.3d 432 (7 th Cir. 2005)	10
<i>Henson v. Denison</i> , 546 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. – Fort Worth 1977, no writ).....	21
<i>Hinojosa v. Columbia/St. David's Healthcare System, L.P.</i> , 106 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.)	21
<i>Ilff v. Ilff</i> , 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011)	31
<i>In re D.C.</i> , No. 05-13-00944-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10006 (Tex. App. Dallas August 9, 2013)(mem. op.)	16
<i>In re Doe</i> , 19 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2000)	34
<i>In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.</i> , 136 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. 2004)(orig. proceeding).....	21
<i>In re Hinterlong</i> , 109 S.W.3d 611 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2003, orig. proceeding).....	20
<i>In re Lipsky</i> , No. 02-12-00348-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth April 22, 2013, orig. proceeding)	passim
<i>In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc.</i> , 275 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. 2008)(orig. proceeding).....	31
<i>In re Team Rocket, L.P.</i> , 256 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. 2008)(orig. proceeding).....	31
<i>In re Thuesen</i> , No. 14-13-00255-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4636 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 th Dist.] April 11, 2013, orig. proceeding).....	3, 25, 31, 32
<i>In re United Scaffolding, Inc.</i> , 301 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. 2010)(orig. proceeding).....	31
<i>In The Supreme Court of Texas</i> , ____ S.W.3d ____, 2013 Tex. LEXIS 180, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 360 (2013)	35

<i>Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Group, Inc.</i> , 395 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2013, no pet. h.)	3, 33
<i>Jennings v. Wallbuilder Presentations, Inc.</i> , 378 S.W.3d 519 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2012, pet. filed).....	passim
<i>King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman</i> , 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003)	34
<i>Kinney v. BCG Attorney Search</i> , No. 03-12-00579-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 (Austin August 21, 2013, no. pet. h.).....	15, 24, 26, 27, 28
<i>KTRK Television, Inc., v. Robinson</i> , No. 01-12-00372, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8463 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] July 11, 2013, no pet. h.)	19, 30
<i>Lipsky v. Range Production Co., et al.</i> , No. 02-12-00098-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7059 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 23, 2012, pets. filed)(mem.op.).....	29, 31
<i>Low v. Henry</i> , 221 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2007)	26
<i>Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc.</i> , 875 S.W.2d 311 (Tex.1994)	32
<i>McDonald v. Clemens</i> , 464 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App. – Tyler 1971, no writ).....	19
<i>Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.</i> , 497 U.S. 1 (1990)	22, 39, 40
<i>National Surety Corp. v. Ladd</i> , 131 Tex. 295, 115 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. 1938)	35
<i>Neely v. Wilson</i> , 2013 Tex. LEXIS 511 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 766 (June 28, 2013)	39, 40, 41
<i>Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd.</i> , No. 01-12-00581-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5407 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] May 2, 2013, no pet. h.).....	passim
<i>N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez</i> , 799 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1990)	29
<i>Osborne v. Ohio</i> , 495 U.S. 103 (1990)	10
<i>Ostrovitz & Gwinn, LLC v. First Specialty Ins. Co.</i> , 393 S.W.3d 379 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2012, no pet.)	22
<i>P&G v. Amway Corp.</i> , 242 F.3d 539 (5 th Cir. 2001)	10
<i>Parker v. Walton</i> , 233 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)	4
<i>Pool v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986)(op. on reh’g)	36
<i>Public Utility Comm’n of Texas v. Cofer</i> , 754 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1988)	35
<i>Quick v. City of Austin</i> , 7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 1998)	35
<i>Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water</i> , 336 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2011)	34
<i>Ramsey v. Lynch</i> , No. 10-12-00198-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5554 (Tex. App. – Waco May 2, 2013, no pet. h.)(mem. op.).....	passim
<i>Rehak Creative Servs. v. Witt</i> , No. 14-12-00658-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 6196 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 th Dist.] May 21, 2013, no pet. h.)	19
<i>Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. Mercer, Inc.</i> , 213 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).....	23

<i>Rodriguez v. Printone Color Corp.</i> , 982 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).....	21
<i>Roth v. United States</i> , 354 U.S. 476 (1957)	10
<i>San Jacinto Title Services v. Kingsley Properties, LP</i> , No. 13-12-003520CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg April 25, 2013, no pet. h.)	passim
<i>Sax v. Votteler</i> , 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983)	20
<i>Service Corp. v. Guerra</i> , 348 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. 2011)	36
<i>Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co.</i> , 559 U.S. 393 (2010)	37
<i>Smith v. Smith</i> , 126 S.W.3d 660 (Tex.App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)	20
<i>Sorokolit v. Rhodes</i> , 889 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1994)	35
<i>Stary v. DeBord</i> , 967 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1998)	29
<i>Stockton v. Offenbach</i> , 336 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. 2011)	35
<i>Summersett v. Jaiyeola</i> , No. 13-12-004442-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8882 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi-Edinburg, July 18, 2013, no pet. h.)	27
<i>Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda</i> , 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004)	36
<i>Tex. Tech Univ. Health Science Ctr. v. Apodaca</i> , 876 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App. – El Paso 1994, writ denied)	21
<i>Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Public Util. Comm’n</i> , 253 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 1997)	34
<i>Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc.</i> , 889 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1994)	20
<i>Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc.</i> , 38 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. 2000)	22, 40
<i>United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.</i> , 190 F.3d 963 (9 th Cir. 1999)	37
<i>UTMB v. Estate of Blackmon</i> , 195 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2006)	25
<i>Vincenty v. Bloomberg</i> , 476 F.3d 74 (2 nd Cir. 2007)	10
<i>Walker v. Packer</i> , 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1991)	31
<i>WFAA-TV Inc. v. McLemore</i> , 978 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1998)	22
<i>Wholesale TV and Radio Advertising, LLC v. Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dallas, Inc.</i> , No. 05-11-01337-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 7348 (Tex. App. – Dallas June 14, 2013, no pet. h.)	13, 22
STATUTES AND RULES	
D.C. CODE § 16-5501-5505	37
FED. R. CIV. P. 1	37, 39
FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)	15
FED. R. CIV. P. 12	13, 37
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)	15
FED. R. CIV. P. 56	37, 39
HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F-1 (2011)	2
LOCAL RULE CV-7(d), U.S. Dist. Ct. W.D. Tex.	15
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.01 et seq.	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 9.001, et seq.	4

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 9.002(a)(2)	4
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 9.003	38
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.001 <i>et seq.</i>	4, 26
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.002(a)	4
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.002(b)	4
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.004	4
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.005	26
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.006	4
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE CHAPTER 22 (SUBCHAPTER C)	18
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.021 <i>et seq.</i>	5
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.024	18
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001, <i>et seq.</i>	1, 39
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(1)	10
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(2)	11
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(3)	10
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(4)	11
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(4)(a)(ii)	10
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(6)	10, 23
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(7)	11
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002	3
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003	1, 26
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a)	9, 13
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(b)	13
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(c)	15, 23
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004	9, 14, 15, 16
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004(a)	13, 14
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004(b)	9, 14
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004(c)	9, 14, 16
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005	1, 15, 32, 33
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(a)	15
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b)	17, 22, 23
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c)	18, 22, 23, 24
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d)	9, 24
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006	14, 24
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a)	17
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(b)	15
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.007	25
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.007(a)	25
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.007(b)	25
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008	27, 28, 29, 30, 34
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(a)	28, 29, 33
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(b)	29, 31, 33, 34
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(c)	9, 33, 34
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009	26
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(a)	26
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(a)(1)	17
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(b)	27
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010	9
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(a)	12
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(b)	12
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(c)	12
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(d)	12
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.011(b)	14, 30
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006	43
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.001(2)	18
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003	26
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014	8, 28, 29, 34

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(6).....	27
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(12).....	8, 28
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(b).....	27
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(6).....	7
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.001 <i>et seq.</i>	7
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.003(a)(3).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.052.....	44
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.053.....	46
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055(a).....	46
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055(b).....	46
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055(c).....	48
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055(d).....	46
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.056(a).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.056(b).....	48
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.057(a).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.057(b).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.057(c).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.057(d).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.057(e).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.058(a).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.058(b).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.058(d).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.059.....	48
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.061(a).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.061(b).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.062.....	48
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.062(a).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.062(b).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.062(c).....	47
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.062(d).....	47, 48
TEX. CONST. Article I, § 8.....	7, 40
TEX. CONST. Article I, § 13.....	20, 40
TEX. CONST. Article V, § 6.....	29
TEX. CONST. Article V, § 31(b).....	38
TEX. CONST. Article V, § 31(c).....	38
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.131(a).....	42
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 273.081.....	42
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.001(a)(2).....	30
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.002.....	33
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.004(c).....	38
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.221.....	33
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.022.....	27
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.023.....	41
TEX. GOV'T CODE § 402.010.....	43
TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1.....	33
TEX. R. APP. P. 26.....	33
TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1.....	33, 34
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.....	33
TEX. R. CIV. P. 1.....	39
TEX. R. CIV. P. 2.....	39
TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.....	4, 26
TEX. R. CIV. P. 21.....	15
TEX. R. CIV. P. 41.....	23
TEX. R. CIV. P. 48.....	16
TEX. R. CIV. P. 51.....	23
TEX. R. CIV. P. 97.....	24
TEX. R. CIV. P. 162.....	25

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166-a	15, 39
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a.....	39
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)	15
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).....	20
TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(a)	24
TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(b).....	24
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a)	16
TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.2	15
TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.2(5).....	15
TEX. R. CIV. P. 215	26

OTHER AUTHORITIES

12 Tex. B. J. 531 (1949).....	39
Black’s Law Dictionary 287 (9 th ed. 2009).....	19
Brief of Univision, <i>Virgilio Avil and Univision Television Group, Inc. v. Larrea</i> , No. 05-11-01637, Court of Appeals of Dallas, Texas.	19
Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, <i>SLAPP/SLAPP Back: The Misuse of Libel Law for Political Purposes and Countersuit Response</i> , 7 J.L. & POL 417, 423 (1991).....	2
George W. Pring, <i>SLAPP: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation</i> , 7 PACE ENV’L L. REV. 3, 5-6 (1998).....	2
H. Comm. On Judiciary and Civ. Jurisprudence, <i>Bill Analysis</i> , Tex. H.B. 2973, 82 nd Leg., R.S. (2011).....	4, 5
H. Comm. On Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, <i>Bill Analysis</i> , Tex. H.B. 2935, 83d Leg., R.S., No. 83R 21446, at 1-2 (Tex. 2013).....	9
H. Comm. On Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, <i>Bill Analysis</i> , Tex. H.B. 1759, 83d Leg., R.S., No. 83R 23145, at 1 (Tex. 2013).....	44
H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, <i>Bill Analysis</i> , TEX. H.B. 1759, 83d Leg., R.S., No. 83R 23145, at 6 (Tex. 2013).....	46
H. Research Org., Texas House of Representatives, <i>Bill Analysis</i> , Tex. H.B. 2973 (May 2, 2011).....	6
Hearing on Tex. H.B. 2973 Before the House Comm. On Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, 82 nd Leg., R.S. 10-17 (March 28, 2011).....	6
Hearing on Tex. C.S.H.B. 2973 Before the Senate Comm. On State Affairs, 82 nd Leg., R.S. (May 12, 2011)	7
Hearing on Tex. H.B. 2935 Before the H. Comm. On Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex 2013).....	8, 9, 44
Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1759 Before the H. Comm. On Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence at 1:43:01, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013).....	45
Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1759 Before the Sen. Comm. On State Affairs, Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013).....	46
http://haynesandboone.com/Laura-Prather/	5
http://www.foift.org/	5
http://www.foift.org/?page_id=796	5

http://www.foift.org/?page_id=1923	5
http://www.sdma.com/laura-prathers-efforts-lead-to-passage-of-texas-anti-slapp-law-06-12-2011/	5
http://www.sdma.com/texas-newsrooms-will-benefit-from-anti-slapp-law-07-15-2011/	19, 22
http://www.house.state.tx.us/video-audio/committee-broadcasts/committee-archives/player/?session=83&committee=330&ram=13040114330	8
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/analysis/pdf/HB02935H.pdf#navpanes=0	9
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/analysis/pdf/HB01759H.pdf#navpanes=0	44, 46
http://www.house.state.tx.us/video-audio/committee-broadcasts/committee-archives/player/?session=83&committee=330&ram=13040114330	45
http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/commit/c570/c570.htm	46
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/senateamendana/pdf/HB01759A.pdf#navpanes=0	46
Jerome I. Braun, <i>Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in California</i> , 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 969-70 (1999).....	2
John G. Osborn & Jeffrey A. Thaler, <i>Feature: Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Law: Special Protection Against Improper Lawsuits Targeting Free Speech and Petitioning</i> , 23 MAINE BAR J. 32 (2008).....	3, 41
Joshua L. Baker, <i>Review of Selected 2003 California Legislation: Civil: Chapter 338: Another New Law, Another SLAPP in the Face of California Business</i> , 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 409 (2004).....	41
Mark J. Sobczak, <i>Symposium: The Modern American Jury: Comment: Slapped in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act</i> , 28 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 559, 560-61 (2008)	2
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 229 (11 th ed. 2003)	19
Nathan L. Hecht & E. Lee Parsley, <i>Procedural Reform: Whence and Whither</i> (Sept. 1997).....	38
Richard J. Yurko and Shannon C. Choy, <i>Legal Analysis: Reconciling the anti-Slapp Statute With Abuse of Process and Other Litigation-Based Torts</i> , 51 B.B.J. 15, 15 (2007).....	2
Sen. Amendments Section-by-Section Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1759, 83d Leg., R.S. No. 13-140-359, at 7 (Tex. 2013).....	46
Tex. H.B. 2935, 83 rd Leg., R.S. (2013)	7, 8, 9
Tex. H.B. 1759, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013)	44
William Shakespeare, <i>Othello</i> , act 3 sc. 3.....	40

MOTIONS TO DISMISS – TEXAS ANTI-SLAPP LAW: TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE CH. 27

I. INTRODUCTION.

On June 17, 2011, Texas Governor Rick Perry affixed his neat signature to Texas' new anti-SLAPP¹ law, entitled the Texas Citizens Participation Act (the "TCPA"), and in so doing Texas joined 28 states and the District of Columbia in enacting various forms of legislation purportedly aimed at preventing frivolous lawsuits from stifling free speech activities and the rights of petition and association.² As drafted, however, the TCPA has been triggering significant unintended consequences, especially for persons and entities who file suit to protect their reputation and various property interests. The TCPA introduces what one judge called a "draconian" motion to dismiss that places a heavy burden on the aggrieved plaintiff to prove that its suit is not frivolous at the inception of the litigation without the benefit of any meaningful discovery.³ The Act does not define the shape or parameters of a SLAPP suit or distinguish between causes of action subject to or protected from the anti-SLAPP statute. In fact, none of the cases currently making their way through the appellate courts could properly be characterized as a SLAPP case. So long as a defendant in a business torts suit can characterize the suit as "based on," "relating to," or "in response to" the exercise of free speech, petition or association, the motion to dismiss can be filed, and unless the

plaintiff presents prima facie evidence of each element of his claim, the motion to dismiss must be granted.⁴

The potential for extension of this recently crafted dispositive motion far beyond the prevention of SLAPP suits is significant. Here are two hypothetical examples:

Example 1: Disgruntled Vocal Car Buyer: Car Dealer sells a new car to a customer who is dissatisfied, and takes her dissatisfaction to the internet and consumer protection agencies. Buyer expresses views that accuse the dealership not only of misrepresentations about worthiness of the vehicle, but that the dealer engages in fraud, illegal kickback schemes, and violations of state and federal advertising laws, some of which carry criminal penalties, and organizes a boycott. Customer sues Car Dealer under the DTPA. Dealer counterclaims for tortious interference and business disparagement, and seeks injunctive relief. How does the TCPA apply?

Example 2: Medical Group Divorce: When Doctor A leaves the practice over the weekend, he takes lists of all patients of the clinic, not just his own, along with all medical files A-K, prior to obtaining any patient consents. Over the weekend Doctor A calls a number of patients and informs them that Doctors B and C are currently under investigation by the Texas Medical Board and are about to lose their licenses because of "rampant allegations" of improper contact with female patients, and urges the patients to leave the clinic to become his patients, and call all their friends and tell them the same thing. When Doctors B and C find out, they file suit against Dr. A seeking injunctive relief for the return of patient files and protected health information, to prevent Dr. A from continuing his communications, and for damages for defamation, business disparagement, and tortious interference. How does the TCPA apply?

II. THE TEXAS CITIZENS PARTICIPATION ACT: WHAT IS IT?

A. Background and Enactment of the TCPA.

1. What is a SLAPP lawsuit?

The general consensus view among commentators is that SLAPP suits are "legally meritless suits designed, from their inception, to intimidate and harass political critics into silence."⁵

¹ "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation."

² See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001, *et seq.* (2011). The 28 other states, in addition to the District of Columbia, are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.

³ In *Cook v. Tom Brown Ministries*, et. al., the Mayor of El Paso filed suit to enjoin violations of the Texas Elections Code by several corporations and a group of individuals. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under the lawsuit under the new anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the corporate contributions at issue in the case were a form of "protected speech." In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Javier Alvarez stated that the new procedure for dismissal of a lawsuit without discovery and with the burden on the plaintiff was too draconian. The authors of this paper were counsel for the plaintiff in that case. See *Cook v. Tom Brown Ministries*, et al., 385 S.W.3d 592 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied) (related interlocutory appeal of temporary injunction).

⁴ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003 & 27.005.

⁵ Mark J. Sobczak, Symposium: *The Modern American Jury: Comment: Slapped in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act*, 28 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 559, 560-61 (2008), quoting Edmond

Hawaii defines a SLAPP suit as “a lawsuit that lacks substantial justification or is interposed for delay or harassment and that is solely based on the party’s public participation before a governmental body.”⁶ According to some views, the typical SLAPP plaintiff “does not seek victory on the merits, but rather victory by attrition.”⁷ The “object is to quell opposition by fear of large recoveries and legal costs, by diverting energy and resources from opposing the project into defending the lawsuit, and by transforming the debate from a political one to a judicial one, with a corresponding shift of issues from the targets’ grievances to the filers’ grievances.”⁸ The goal of a SLAPP suit is to “stop citizens from exercising their political rights or to punish them for having done so.”⁹ None of the reported Texas decisions to date defines the scope of a SLAPP suit.

By definition, in the “typical” SLAPP case the motivation of the plaintiff is not to achieve a legal victory resulting in a judgment, but instead to make it prohibitively expensive and burdensome for the defendant to continue participation in her constitutionally protected activity. The concept assumes that the SLAPP plaintiff enjoys a great advantage in resources to fund litigation, and can afford to overwhelm the defendant with lawsuit expenses and fees. As one commentator explained, “[t]he typical SLAPP suit is brought by a well-heeled ‘Goliath’ against a ‘David’ with fewer resources, trying to keep David from opposing, for example, Goliath’s development plans or other goal.”¹⁰ The developer tale is a frequently cited example of a SLAPP suit.¹¹

Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, *SLAPP/SLAPP back: The Misuse of Libel Law for Political Purposes and Countersuit Response*, 7 J.L. & POL 417, 423 (1991).

⁶ HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F-1 (2011).

⁷ Sobczak, *supra*, at 561.

⁸ *Id.*, quoting Jerome I. Braun, *Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in California*, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 969-70 (1999).

⁹ *Id.*, citing George W. Pring, *SLAPP: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation*, 7 PACE ENV’L L. REV. 3, 5-6 (1998).

¹⁰ Richard J. Yurko and Shannon C. Choy, *Legal Analysis: Reconciling the anti-SLAPP Statute With Abuse of Process and Other Litigation-Based Torts*, 51 B.B.J. 15, 15 (2007).

¹¹ See John G. Osborn and Jeffrey A. Thaler, *Feature: Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Law: Special Protection Against Improper Lawsuits Targeting Free Speech and Petitioning*, 23 MAINE BAR J. 32 (2008). A powerful developer files a frivolous defamation lawsuit against a group of outspoken homeowners that oppose the developer’s plans to build an industrial facility in their backyard. The developer’s complaint “is sufficiently drafted to survive... [a] motion to

If indeed the purpose and scope of the new law coincide, Chapter 27 will provide a salutary benefit consistent with the traditional fierce defense Americans have provided to free speech rights. Whether the law applies in limited circumstances to prevent actual intimidation of free speakers remains to be seen as cases proceed through litigation.

2. Stated Purpose: Prevent Frivolous Suits.

The Citizens Participation Act was theoretically enacted to provide an expedited procedure to dismiss retaliatory, frivolous lawsuits that chill free speech. In adding a new chapter to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,¹² the Legislature included a brief statement of purpose:

The purpose of this chapter is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002. This statutory provision is frequently cited as the appellate courts struggle to understand how to apply the new law.¹³

dismiss, and the developer then embarks upon a course of oppressive discovery and motion practice, forcing the defendants to engage in extensive document production and a seemingly endless string of depositions.” “After years of litigation, the defendants prevail at summary judgment or trial—but the victory is, in fact, the developer’s. The cost, stress and time involved in defending against the suit has fractured the community group, sapped the energy and financial resources of the group’s members, diverted their efforts from actually opposing the industrial plant and chilled the likelihood of future opposition to similar projects because of the toll the lawsuit took on the group and its members.” *Id.*

¹² The Chapter is entitled: “ACTIONS INVOLVING THE EXERCISE OF CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.”

¹³ *Ramsey v. Lynch*, No. 10-12-00198-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5554 *4 (Tex. App. – Waco May 2, 2013, no pet. h.)(mem. op.); *Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd.*, No. 01-12-00581-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5407 *15 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] May 2, 2013, no pet. h.); *San Jacinto Title Services v. Kingsley Properties, LP*, No. 13-12-003520CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081 *12 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg April 25, 2013, no pet. h.); *In re Lipsky*, No. 02-12-00348-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975 *11 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth April 22, 2013, orig. proceeding); *In re Thuesen*, No. 14-13-00255-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4636 (Tex. App.

The Act's legislative history states that it was intended to target "frivolous lawsuits aimed at silencing citizens who are participating in the free exchange of ideas" and "frivolous lawsuits aimed at retaliating against someone who exercises the person's right of association, free speech, or right of petition."¹⁴ Yet the Legislature did not discuss the applicability of existing anti-frivolous lawsuit rules and statutes,¹⁵ or how such established body of law was inadequate to curtail any perceived harm. Nothing in the legislative history of the Act discusses why the existing statutory framework for discouraging frivolous suits of all kinds was found lacking, or why Chapters 9 and 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code should not be amended to address an unmet need.¹⁶ Cases involving speech and traditional

First Amendment rights are not exempted from the frivolous case deterrence functions of Rule 13 and Chapters 9 and 10. In fact, Chapter 9 specifically applies to cases involving defamation and tortious interference.¹⁷

The Legislature did not otherwise define a frivolous lawsuit in the context of the statute, or define what constitutes a "meritorious lawsuit" that would otherwise not be subject to the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. Despite the stated legislative intent, the Legislature did not require that a movant prove that a suit was frivolous in order to have it dismissed under the TCPA. The disconnect between the statutory provisions and the anti-frivolous suit rhetoric of the legislative history suggests that we dig deeper into the history of this law in order to better understand it.

– Houston [14th Dist.] April 11, 2013, orig. proceeding); *Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Group, Inc.*, 395 S.W. 3d 394, 396 Tex. App. – Dallas 2013, no pet. h.); *Direct Commercial Funding, Inc. v. Beacon Hill Estates*, No. 14-12-00896-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1898 *2 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] January 24, 2013, no pet. h.); *Avila and Univision v. Larrea*, 394 S.W.3d 646, 653 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2012, pet. filed); *Jennings v. Wallbuilder Presentations, Inc.*, 378 S.W.3d 519 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2012, pet. filed).

¹⁴ House Comm. On Judiciary and Civ. Jurisprudence, *Bill Analysis*, Tex. HB 2973, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011).

¹⁵ See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13, which provides, among other things, for sanctions to be imposed only upon "good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order," for a pleading that is "groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment"(the common definition of a frivolous pleading). Every pleading is required to be signed, which signature is a certification that the pleading is not frivolous. A party who brings a suit knowing that it is frivolous "shall be held guilty of a contempt." "'Groundless' for purposes of this rule means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Knowing that sanctions are available, "Courts shall presume that pleadings, motions, and other papers are filed in good faith." Accordingly, the party resisting the suit has the burden to prove that the suit is frivolous. "Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence; rather, it is the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purposes. Improper motive is an essential element of bad faith. Harassment means that the pleading was intended to annoy, alarm, and abuse another person." *Parker v. Walton*, 233 S.W.3d 535, 539-540 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Rule 13 permits the trial court to order the offending party to pay fees, expenses, and discouragement sanctions. See also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 9.001, *et seq.*, 10.001 *et seq.*

¹⁶ Chapter 9 applies to "Frivolous Pleadings & Claims." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 9.001, *et seq.* (enacted 1987). In enacting Chapter 10, the Legislature in 1995 went even further than Rule 13, and enumerated frivolous

3. Underlying Purpose: Protection of Media Defendants.

It appears that the statute is a solution in search of a problem. The legislative history of the TCPA provides little guidance as to what evidence of SLAPP lawsuits the Legislature considered, if any. The House Committee on Judiciary and Civil Jurisprudence report was silent about whether any studies or data existed to demonstrate a particular need for the bill, other than generally stating that "abuses of the legal system have also grown, including the filing of frivolous lawsuits aimed at silencing these citizens who are participating in the free exchange of ideas."¹⁸ There was no data suggesting that there was any widespread abuse of suits involving speech issues, nor was there any indication that the bill was intended to correct any specific case. The report did not discuss any correlation of the bill with media interests.

The legislative history of the TCPA is devoid of any scientific or statistical evidence regarding the frequency or impact of SLAPP lawsuits in Texas, or how often individuals or businesses face meritless

pleadings that could be subject to sanctions, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.001, and spelled out the sanctions available, including fees and expenses, and sanctions to deter future conduct, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.004. Chapter 10 provides a mechanism for a party to file a motion for sanctions or, on its own initiative, a court may issue a show cause order and direct the alleged violator to show cause why the conduct has not violated the statute. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.002(a,b). The Legislature even prohibits the Texas Supreme Court from amending or adopting rules in conflict with the statute. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.006.

¹⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 9.002(a)(2).

¹⁸ House Comm. On Judiciary and Civ. Jurisprudence, *Bill Analysis*, Tex. HB 2973, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011).

defamation or disparagement lawsuits. The author has yet to find any such studies or research, or any published data on the frequency or significance of any SLAPP lawsuits in Texas.

According to the H.R.O., supporters of the bill argued that “SLAPP suits chill public debate because they cost money to defend, even if the person being sued was speaking the truth.”¹⁹ Supporters claimed: “[u]nder current law, the victim of a SLAPP suit must rely on a motion for summary judgment. While summary judgment disposes of a controversy before a trial, both parties still must conduct expensive discovery. By allowing a motion to dismiss, [the TCPA] would allow frivolous lawsuits to be dismissed at the outset of the proceeding, promoting the constitutional rights of citizens and helping to alleviate some of the burden on the court system”²⁰

Further research reveals the impetus behind the passage of the Act. Corpus Christi representative Todd Hunter was the principal designated legislative author of H.B. 2973. Representative Hunter worked with the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas (“FOIFT”)²¹, represented by lawyer Laura Prather,²² in passing the legislation. The FOIFT receives its funding principally from state and national newspaper publishers, along with other media interests.²³ Media organizations, including FOIFT, were the principal proponents of both the TCPA²⁴ and the 2009 adoption of the reporter’s privilege, codified in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.021 *et seq.*

Ms. Prather, for the media groups, publicly states that she drafted the TCPA and proposed, organized, and supported its passage.²⁵ In her most recent online biography, Ms. Prather states that she “was the lead author and negotiator for the two most significant pieces of First Amendment legislation in recent history in Texas – both the reporters’ privilege and the

anti-SLAPP statute.”²⁶ She also states that “[t]he bill is designed to deter frivolous lawsuits directed at newsrooms and media personnel.”²⁷

Given the context of the media organizations’ viewpoint and their efforts to further insulate the press from legal liability for its actions, the proposal of a summary mechanism to allow media to have their counsel attempt dismissal of defamation suits without discovery may have been a logical next step. Recognizing that the media was the principal proponent of the TCPA helps us better understand the purpose of the statute.

In true winning legislative fashion, the media interests caused the statute to be named the “Citizens Participation Act,” rather than the “Make It Harder to Sue the Media Act,” which may more accurately reflects the law’s true purpose. Indeed, two of the nine reported cases to date involve media defendants as the movants to dismiss.²⁸

According to the Bill Analysis and legislative records, the principal witness before the House Judiciary and Civil Jurisprudence Committee was Ms. Prather, appearing for the FOIFT, the Texas Association of Broadcasters, the Better Business Bureau, and the Texas Daily Newspaper Association. Despite the overarching media protection purpose, the only example of alleged abuse that House Research Organization cited in its Bill Analysis was a doctor who sued “a woman who complained to the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners about the doctor and later complained to a television station.”²⁹ According to the H.R.O., “[t]he suit eventually was dismissed, but the television station was forced to pay \$100,000 in legal expenses.”³⁰ The H.R.O. did not give any other details about the case, or how it constituted a victory for the woman.

The bill was brought up for testimony on March 28, 2011 before the House Judiciary and Civil Jurisprudence Committee,³¹ which heard comments

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ See <http://www.foift.org/>.

²² Ms. Prather was with Sedgwick, and in 2012 joined the Austin office of Haynes & Boone as a partner.

²³ See http://www.foift.org/?page_id=796 for a listing of “sponsors.”

²⁴ See http://www.foift.org/?page_id=1923 for FOIFT’s discussion of the passage of the Act.

²⁵ See Ms. Prather’s news release at <http://www.sdma.com/laura-prathers-efforts-lead-to-passage-of-texas-anti-slapp-law-06-12-2011/>. The news release was taken down after Ms. Prather joined Haynes & Boone in early June, 2012, but the Sedgwick release was virtually identical to the current Haynes & Boone biography description.

²⁶ See Ms. Prather’s bio at <http://haynesandboone.com/Laura-Prather/>.

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ *Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd.*, No. 01-12-00581-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5407 *15 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] May 2, 2013, no pet. h.); *Avila and Univision v. Larrea*, 394 S.W.3d at 653.

²⁹ H. Research Org., Texas House of Representatives, *Bill Analysis*, Tex. H.B. 2973 (May 2, 2011).

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ Chair, Jim Jackson (R) Dist. 115; Vice Chair, Tryon Lewis (R) Dist. 81; Rep. Dwayne Bohac (R) Dist. 138; Rep. Joaquin Castro (D) Dist. 125; Rep. Sarah Davis (R) Dist. 134; Rep. Will Hartnett (R) Dist. 114; Rep. Jerry Madden (R) Dist. 67; Rep. Richard Raymond (D) Dist. 42; Rep.

from several witnesses, mostly associated with the media.³² At the hearing, Rep. Hunter commented that “[i]t [TCPA] also provides for an expedited motion to dismiss if lawsuits like these are filed frivolously.”³³ The TCPA was one of 31 bills considered by the Committee that day, and the Committee devoted 33 minutes of its schedule to the discussion of the bill. Following the Committee hearing, there is no record of any further discussion in a committee, conference, or on the floor of the House. The bill passed the House on May 4, 2011.

On May 12, 2011, the bill was considered in public hearing in the Senate Committee on State Affairs³⁴ and discussed for three minutes, with no discussion beyond a basic description of the bill.³⁵ The bill passed the Senate on May 18.

The legislative history does not discuss media involvement, provides no examples of media litigation, or how the First Amendment and successive generations of litigation has proved inadequate to protect the media from meritless defamation suits.

The Committee did not discuss why a new expedited dispositive motion or appellate review was necessary for media or other defendants, given the Legislature’s codification of libel law,³⁶ and granting to the media interlocutory appeals in the event that a media defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.³⁷

Connie Scott (R) Dist. 34; Rep. Senfronia Thompson (D) Dist. 141; Rep. Beverly Wooley (R) Dist. 136.

³² Speaking for the bill: Laura Prather (Better Business Bureau, Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas, Texas Daily Newspaper Association, Texas Association of Broadcasters); Carla Main (journalist); Robin Lent (Coalition for Homeowners Association Reform); Brenda Johnson (HOA); Shane Fitzgerald (FOIFT); Joe Ellis (Texas Association of Broadcasters); and Janet Ahmad (Home Owners for Better Building). The Texas Citizens Participation Act; Hearings on Tex. H.B. 2973 Before the House Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, 82nd Leg., R.S. 10-17 (March 28, 2011). Sixteen others registered but did not testify.

³³ The Texas Citizens Participation Act; Hearings on Tex. H.B. 2973 Before the House Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, 82nd Leg., R.S. 10-17 (March 28, 2011)(Rep. Todd Hunter).

³⁴ Robert Duncan (R) Lubbock, Chair.

³⁵ Hearing on Tex. CSHB 2973 Before the Senate Committee on State Affairs, 82nd Leg., R.S. (May 12, 2011).

³⁶ See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.001 *et seq.*

³⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §51.014(6) grants an appeal from an interlocutory order that: “denies a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in part upon a claim against or defense by a member of the electronic or print media, acting in such capacity, or a

Opponents argued that the TCPA, “if interpreted broadly, could be used to intimidate legitimate plaintiffs. It could stifle suits brought legitimately under libel or slander laws because the plaintiff in such suits would have to overcome motions testing its pleadings.”³⁸

The media interests successfully cast the legislation as protection for the average citizen, especially persons who faced larger, better-funded litigation opponents. The proponents avoided allowing a discussion of larger, well-funded media entities defending suits brought by individuals or small businesses. The proponents apparently successfully convinced the Legislature that their vote in favor of the legislation was a vote for “the little guy,” since the Legislature passed the TCPA by unanimous vote in both the House and the Senate. There is nothing in the legislative history for the statute that suggests that the Legislature considered any of the issues raised in this paper before speeding the bill through the approval process.

4. The 2013 Amendments: Still Media-Driven.

On June 14 Governor Perry signed into law, effective immediately, H.B. 2973,³⁹ which expanded the scope of interlocutory appeals from a denial of a motion to dismiss under TCPRC Chapter 27, and extended hearing deadlines. Since its passage in 2011, parties have discovered that motions to dismiss under TCPRC Chapter 27 can be an effective way to dismiss reputational tort suits and other actions based on communications. Litigation and appeals under Chapter 27 revealed a number of flaws in the law, including what orders could be subject to the interlocutory appeal process created in Chapter 27. There was a division of authority between the 1st, 2nd, 13th and 14th Courts of Appeals on whether any order denying a motion to dismiss could be subject to an interlocutory appeal.

Rep. Todd Hunter was again the principal named proponent and introduced H.B. 2935 to address interlocutory appeals. Supported by the same media interests that were the primary sponsors of Chapter 27, H.B. did not amend Chapter 27, but instead amended TCPRC Section 51.014, which generally designates when a party is entitled to an interlocutory appeal,

person whose communication appears in or is published by the electronic or print media, arising under the free speech or free press clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution, or Chapter 73 [of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code].”

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ Tex. H.B. 2935, 8d Leg., R.S. (2013).

only in the event of a denial, not granting, of a motion to dismiss.⁴⁰

H.B. 2935 was referred to the Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Committee, which heard testimony in favor of the bill on April 1, 2013.⁴¹ Representative Todd Hunter introduced the bill, and then Laura Prather (on behalf of herself, the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas, Texas Press Association, and Texas Association of Broadcasters), Arif Panju (on behalf of The Institute for Justice), and Shane Fitzgerald (on behalf of his self and the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas) testified in favor of the bill. No questions were asked by the Committee members throughout the testimony.

Hunter and Prather described H.B. 2935 as a “housekeeping measure.” Noting a split between appellate courts in interpreting the TCPA, Prather said, “It clarifies the intent of the legislature in the last session to permit an interlocutory appeal of any denial of a motion to dismiss under chapter 27.”⁴²

Panju provided an example of a case in which a private developer sued the author of a book about eminent domain, the book’s publisher, and other entities. After a couple of years of litigation, an appellate court determined the developer had no evidence to support his claims. Panju testified that had the TCPA been in effect at that time, it would have placed the burden on the developer to show the case was not a SLAPP suit at an early stage of the litigation. Panju said the bill “solidifies the press and individual’s First Amendment rights to participate, engage in the public discourse without fear that their critique of government power or public projects or private developers . . . would shut them up through a lawsuit.”⁴³

Fitzgerald, Vice-President of the *Corpus Christi Caller-Times*, testified before the Committee regarding an instance in which a woman threatened to sue the newspaper after a photographer captured an image from a public space. The newspaper’s attorney discussed the TCPA with the woman’s attorney, and a case was never filed. Fitzgerald described the incident as an example of how “the bill is working as it was intended.”⁴⁴

The Committee made two substantial revisions to the bill. First, it eliminated a provision that specifically denied retroactive effectiveness by removing the following language: “The change in law made by this Act applies to a denial of a motion to dismiss made on or after the effective date of this Act. A denial of a motion to dismiss made before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect immediately before the effective date of this Act, and that law is continued in effect for that purpose.”⁴⁵ Additionally, C.S.H.B. 2935 repealed a provision under the TCPA itself—Section 27.008(c), which set a 60-day deadline for filing an appeal or writ related to a TCPA motion.⁴⁶

Upon review in the Senate, the scope of the bill expanded to amend Section 27.004 to extend the deadline for a hearing on a motion to dismiss from 30 to 60 days following the date of service of the motion. The Senate also added to the hearing deadline exception by either a showing of good cause, or an agreement of the parties, and limiting such extension to no more than 90 days after service of the motion. The amendments to 27.004 also added a provision to allow a trial court to take judicial notice that docket conditions required a later hearing date, and, finally, allowed the court to extend the hearing date to conduct discovery, but for no more than 120 days after service of the motion.⁴⁷

In addition to amending Section 27.010 to exempt from Chapter 27 legal actions brought under the Insurance Code or arising out of an insurance contract, the bill added Section 27.005(d), which required the court to dismiss an action if the defendant/movant established by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of an affirmative or other valid defense.⁴⁸ This was not included in the

⁴⁰ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §51.014(a)(12).

⁴¹ Transcripts are no longer taken of committee meetings. However, a video recording of the testimony is available for download at <http://www.house.state.tx.us/video-audio/committee-broadcasts/committee-archives/player/?session=83&committee=330&ram=13040114330>. Real Player, which can be downloaded at no cost, is needed to view the video. Testimony relating to Tex. H.B. 2935 begins in the recording at 1:27:06 and ends at 1:33:02.

⁴² *Hearing on Tex. H.B. 2935 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence*, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013) (statement of Laura Prather, on behalf of the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas, Texas Press Association, and Texas Association of Broadcasters).

⁴³ *Hearing on Tex. H.B. 2935 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence*, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013) (statement of Arif Panju, on behalf of The Institute for Justice).

⁴⁴ *Hearing on Tex. H.B. 2935 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence*, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013) (statement of Shane Fitzgerald, on behalf of the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas).

⁴⁵ H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, *Bill Analysis*, TEX. H.B. 2935, 83d Leg., R.S., No. 83R 21446, at 1–2 (Tex. 2013), available at <http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/analysis/pdf/HB02935H.pdf#navpanes=0>.

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004(b,c).

⁴⁸ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d).

original Chapter 27, and now allows a movant to essentially conduct a mini-motion for summary judgment or trial.

None of the amendments addressed the principal stated basis for the law, namely that it was intended to prevent strategic lawsuits against public participation.

III. APPLICATION OF THE TCPA.

A. What Claims are Covered?

The TCPA applies to “a *legal action* [that] is *based on, relates to, or is in response to* a party’s exercise of the right of free *speech*, right to *petition*, or right of *association*...”⁴⁹ The law applies only to cases filed on or after June 17, 2011, the effective date of the Act, and does not apply retroactively to amended pleadings in legal actions filed before the effective date.⁵⁰

Each of these concepts was defined by the Legislature very broadly. A “legal action” “means a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal or equitable relief.”⁵¹ Since a motion to dismiss may be made regarding any “judicial pleading or filing” in which some relief is requested, it appears that motions to dismiss may not be filed in administrative proceedings, although administrative proceedings are clearly included within the ambit of the “exercise of the right to petition,” which includes “an official proceeding, other than a judicial proceeding, to administer the law....”⁵² Clearly, though, a motion to dismiss may be filed in response to any sort of pleading or filing in a judicial matter, including, conceivably, motions to dismiss.

No cases have yet addressed the last issue, namely, whether it is proper to file a motion to dismiss a motion to dismiss. The argument for the counter-motion would be that the plaintiff was simply exercising the right to petition by filing suit, and the motion to dismiss was filed specifically in response to the lawsuit, and the motion to dismiss violates the right to petition. This tactic has been used from time to time in other states with anti-SLAPP laws, but a full treatment is beyond the scope of this article. Plaintiff/respondents who consider filing a counter-motion should review some of the California decisions.

“Exercise of the right of free speech” means a communication made in connection with a matter of

public concern.”⁵³ “‘Communication’ includes the making or submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic.”⁵⁴

Importantly, the broad definitions of the First Amendment rights in the statute suggest that a movant may file a motion to dismiss even if the speech or communication is not afforded full protection under the First Amendment.⁵⁵

A “matter of public concern” is very broad and subject to different interpretations, since it “includes an issue related to:

- (A) health or safety;
- (B) environmental, economic, or community well-being;
- (C) the government;
- (D) a public official or public figure; or
- (E) a good, product, or service in the marketplace.”

⁵³ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(3).

⁵⁴ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(1).

⁵⁵ A number of categories of speech receive little or no First Amendment protection. “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, 315 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942). Obscenity enjoys no First Amendment protection and may be banned simply because a legislature concludes that banning it protects “the social interest in order and morality.” *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). Child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. *Osborne v. Ohio*, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). Advocacy directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action is also not protected by the First Amendment. *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).

Other categories of speech receive limited protection under the First Amendment. “Commercial speech” receives less First Amendment protection, and *false* commercial speech receives none. *P&G v. Amway Corp.*, 242 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2001). Importantly, commercial speech may relate to a matter of “public concern,” but it nonetheless receives limited First Amendment protection as commercial speech if the motivation of the speaker is primarily economic. *Id.* at 556. Misleading commercial speech receives no First Amendment protection. *Goodman v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Reg.*, 430 F.3d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 2005). Content-neutral restrictions, such as time, place, or manner restrictions, as well as incidental restrictions on speech, also enjoy less First Amendment protection. *Vincenty v. Bloomberg*, 476 F.3d 74, 84 (2nd Cir. 2007). Defamation is clearly an exception to the First Amendment, in which greater protection is afforded to public officials and figures.

⁴⁹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a)(emphasis added).

⁵⁰ *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081*18-19.

⁵¹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(6).

⁵² TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(4)(a)(ii).

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(7).

What *does not* constitute a “matter of public concern” will be open to debate and litigation, undoubtedly, for some time to come. In private enterprise, is there anything that is not “a good, product, or service in the marketplace?” A “matter of public concern” can apply to almost anything. So far courts have found a mayor’s performance as a public official,⁵⁶ operation of an assisted living facility,⁵⁷ gas leaks from fracking,⁵⁸ a lawyer’s legal services,⁵⁹

“Exercise of the right of petition” means any of the following: (1) a communication “in or pertaining to” a judicial, administrative, executive, legislative, or public proceeding, including all types of public hearings and meeting before any governmental body, (2) a communication “in connection with” an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, judicial, or other governmental body, (3) a communication that is “reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue by any governmental body, (4) a communication “reasonably likely to enlist public participation” in an effort to effect consideration of an issue by any governmental body, and, (5) any communication protected by the Texas or federal constitutions.⁶⁰

“Exercise of the right of association” means “a communication between individuals who join together to collectively express, promoted, pursue, or defend common interests.”⁶¹

Although the Legislature went to great pains to define “free speech,” “petition,” “association,” and “communication,” it did not specify what it means by “based on, relates to, or is in response to....” Broadly stated, the Act applies to any judicial proceeding⁶² about a communication related to anything in commerce or government.

By its own terms, the Act does not protect any violations of the law. The Act is not limited to common law claims that traditionally involve “speech,” such as defamation, business disparagement, false light, and related actions. The Act may also apply to other business torts, such as tortious interference with contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, some intentional torts, malicious prosecution, and even certain statutory actions, such as violations of the Texas Election Code.

Despite the underlying David/Goliath premise of anti-SLAPP legislation, there is no discussion or requirement in disparity of resources to invoke the TCPA.⁶³ Courts so far decline to affix the SLAPP label.⁶⁴

B. Exceptions to the TCPA.

Perhaps recognizing the overbroad nature of the statutory definitions, the proponents provided three general categories of exemptions from the application of the statute, including government enforcement actions,⁶⁵ suits for bodily injury, wrongful death, or survival,⁶⁶ and actions brought *against* a “person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, if the statement or conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or an insurance product or a commercial transaction in which the intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer.”⁶⁷

It is this last exception, the commercial speech exception, that is likely to occupy an increasing amount of the time of trial and appellate courts. The language is very broad and open to significant interpretation. So, would a physician who sues an ex-partner in a “doctor divorce” case for tortious interference and defamation related to advertising for patients be subject to a Chapter 27 dismissal motion, or would the case be exempt as arising from commercial speech? What about a suit between a business and a trade organization over comments in the trade organization’s membership drive documents?

The insurance industry, at least, has paid close attention to the commercial speech exception and sought clarification. In the last session, the Legislature added another exemption, namely “legal actions brought under the Insurance Code or arising out of an insurance contract.”⁶⁸ The legislative history

⁶³ Importantly, neither the TCPA nor other anti-SLAPP statutes contain a requirement that the defendant be economically disadvantaged as compared to the plaintiff, and most states do not require that the plaintiff have the improper motive of interfering with the constitutional rights of the defendant. In fact, it is highly questionable whether any state of mind is necessary to dismiss a lawsuit under the TCPA and similar statutes. See, *infra*, Discussion Part II.

⁶⁴ See, e.g., *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081*2 n.1 (...we take no position on whether the underlying lawsuit in this case constitutes a SLAPP suit.”).

⁶⁵ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(a).

⁶⁶ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(c).

⁶⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(b)(emphasis added).

⁶⁸ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(d). The Legislature also amended Section 27.010(b), to insert “insurance services” following “insurance product” among

⁵⁶ *Ramsey*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5554 *10.

⁵⁷ *Crazy Hotel*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5407 *18.

⁵⁸ *Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975 *21.

⁵⁹ *Larrea*, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10469 *19.

⁶⁰ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(4).

⁶¹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(2).

⁶² And possibly administrative proceedings.

is silent as to why such provision was added, and there was no testimony or evidence that insurance litigation was endangered. The net result is to disallow to insurance agents or companies that are defendants in insurance product and services litigation the ability to file a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss.

Yet these statutory exemptions fall short of curing the potential for abuse of the TCPA, and actually create a disparate impact on certain businesses. For example, the last noted exemption applies to actions brought *against* a “person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services,” which would include entities such as a new or used car dealer. That is, the motion to dismiss is not available to a car dealer that defends a DTPA suit over alleged misrepresentations about sale or service, because that would be an action “against” the dealer, and because it “arises out of the sale or lease of goods.” In Example 1, Car Dealer cannot avail itself of the motion to dismiss in response to the DTPA suit by Customer, although the Customer can bring a motion to dismiss against Car Dealer in response to its counterclaim.

Thus far the Better Business Bureaus in Dallas and Houston have managed to fend off allegations that their ratings of businesses fall under the commercial speech exclusion, as the reviewing courts have found that the BBB’s online business reviews and ratings amount to protected speech, because the intended audience is the consumer public at large, not the business to which the BBB attempts to sell membership services.⁶⁹

C. Procedure.

1. A New Form of Dispositive Motion.

To be very clear, the TCPA’s motion to dismiss is a procedure new to Texas civil jurisprudence. The TCPA does not appear to grant any substantive rights. It creates no cause of action, and the motion to dismiss is not a counterclaim. The TCPA simply creates a new procedure for summary dismissal of claims and suits based on matters outside the pleadings. As a dispositive motion, it is very different from any

motion for summary judgment or even a Federal Rule 12 motion to dismiss.

The only prerequisite for filing the motion is that the movant claims that it is in response to a “legal action” that is based on or relates to the exercise of free speech, petition or association.⁷⁰ The defendant/movant need not wait to file a motion for summary judgment and need not conduct any discovery, or allow any discovery to be conducted, before filing. The motion to dismiss does not mirror or track federal prompt disposition motions under FED. R. CIV. P. 12. The motion is not required to be sworn, but it may be supported by affidavits, and, presumably, documents and publications.

2. Deadline to File the Motion.

The motion to dismiss must be filed within 60 days following the service of the legal action.⁷¹ The time to file the motion to dismiss may be extended on a showing of good cause.⁷² The length, or number, of extensions is not addressed in the statute.

3. Deadline for Hearing and Decision: “Set,” “Rule,” and Continuances.

The hearing on the motion must be “set” not later than 60 days after the date of service of the motion, unless the court’s docket conditions require a later hearing, upon a showing of good cause, or by agreement of the parties.⁷³ There is no guideline as to how long the hearing may be delayed due to the court’s “docket conditions,” nor does the statute define the term. “Docket conditions” found to excuse a trial court’s conducting a hearing after the 30-day deadline included a delay due to the recusal of the trial court after the filing of the motion to dismiss, and until a new judge was assigned to the cause of action.⁷⁴

The extensions are not to take the hearing further than 90 days after service of the dismissal motion, except where discovery is allowed.⁷⁵ The 2013 amendments also allow the trial court to take judicial notice of the court’s docket conditions, but reiterate that the hearing must still occur no more than 90 days after service of the dismissal motion.⁷⁶

the types of commercial speech activities exempt from Chapter 27.

⁶⁹ See *Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Services*, No. 01-12-00990-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 *12-13 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2013, no pet. h.); *Wholesale TV and Radio Advertising, LLC v. Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dallas, Inc.*, No. 05-11-01337-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 7348 *5-6 (Tex. App. – Dallas June 14, 2013, no pet. h.); *Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dallas, Inc. v. BH DFW, Inc.*, 402 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2013, no pet. h.); *Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dallas, Inc. v. Ward.*, 401 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2013, no pet. h.)

⁷⁰ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a).

⁷¹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(b).

⁷² TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a).

⁷³ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004(a). This provision was amended in 2013 to change the deadline from 30 to 60 days, and to add good cause and agreement exceptions, and to add subsections (b) and (c).

⁷⁴ *Ramsey*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5554*12.

⁷⁵ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004(a).

⁷⁶ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004(b).

Pursuant to the amendments, in the event that discovery is allowed under Section 27.006, the court may extend the hearing date, but no longer than 120 days after service of the Chapter 27 motion.⁷⁷

Does the provision mean that the hearing must be concluded? Or may it be continued without doing violence to the mandatory deadlines? The 2013 amendments do not address these issues.

There is a split of authority on whether a continuance of a hearing complies with the deadlines or whether the ruling must still be made within the deadline for the setting of the hearing. The opinion in the *Ramsey* case does not include information on whether the trial court made a “docket conditions” finding, or whether it was simply not heard, and the “docket conditions” finding was simply made by the court of appeals. When the trial court makes no finding that the docket conditions of the court required a hearing outside the [prior deadline of] thirty days, a continuance after the hearing started to allow parties to obtain new counsel “did not stop the statutory-deadline clock,” and thus motions to dismiss were denied by operation of law.⁷⁸

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals has taken a different approach than the First Court in Houston, finding that “the plain language of Section 27.004 applies to the setting, not the hearing or consideration, of a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss; if the legislature had meant to require the holding of a hearing within thirty days (or as soon as the trial court’s docket allows) rather than the setting of a hearing within that time period, it knew how to say so.”⁷⁹

⁷⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004(c).

⁷⁸ *Crazy Hotel*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5407 *14.

⁷⁹ *Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975 *16. The court of appeals referred to sections of the Family and Finance Codes for language regarding “holding” hearings. In this case arising from claims that fracking in the Barnett Shale caused gas contamination of water wells, the property owners (Lipskys) sued the oil and gas company (Range Production) for damages, only to be faced with counterclaims from Range Production for civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, defamation, and business disparagement. *Id.* at *6. The Lipskys timely filed Chapter 27 motions to dismiss the counterclaims and the trial court was unable to conduct a hearing until just over two months later due to intervening docket conditions [for which there was no apparent finding, but Range concedes the issue – this was not an issue decided by the court of appeals]. The Friday before the Monday hearing Range filed a response with an appendix containing more than 1,600 documents. *Id.* at *14. The following Monday, the Lipskys sought a continuance of the hearing to digest the response. The trial court continued the hearing for about six weeks then issued an order about two weeks later denying the motions to dismiss. *Id.* The Lipskys contended that they complied with Section 27.004 because the hearing was set timely, and the statute does not require it to be heard within thirty days.

The 2013 amendment that permits delay for good cause is a welcome change. Other than good cause and agreement, there is no provision to allow the trial court to allow the respondent additional time to respond, for whatever reason. There is also no provision that requires more than the standard default three days’ notice of the hearing.⁸⁰ There is nothing in the statute to prevent the movant from filing the motion and setting it for hearing with minimum notice under Rule 21. The 21-day notice provision of TEX. R. CIV. P. 166-a does not apply. Even with summary judgment motions, trial courts have long been permitted to alter the hearing date “on leave of court,” which does not necessarily mean good cause.⁸¹ The TCPA does not include any provision to allow the non-movant to file a response, or even provide any time in which to file a response, contrary to Texas and federal rules of procedure. The TCPA does not even afford the non-movant the limited time to respond to a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in federal court, or extend the time to respond.⁸²

Once the hearing is set, the court must *rule* on the motion not later than 30 days following the hearing.⁸³ What does it mean to “rule” on the motion? Does it mean to make some ruling, such as for continuance, or to either “dismiss” or “not dismiss?” One court that directly addressed this issue found that there are only two options are described in Section 27.005, and that a court does not “rule on” a motion to dismiss for purposes of Section 27.005(a) when it enters an order to allow discovery and continue the hearing.⁸⁴ But a court does “rule on” the motion when it states in writing within two days following a hearing that the

Id. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted that Section 27.011(b) requires courts to construe Chapter 27 liberally to “effectuate its purpose and intent fully,” and that “applying the statute’s plain meaning does not lead to an absurd result because that meaning encourages trial courts to resolve a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss quickly while allowing flexibility for extending the time for hearing the motion under circumstances similar to those that relators faced in this case.” *Id.* at *17.

⁸⁰ TEX. R. CIV. P. 21.

⁸¹ See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

⁸² See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); Local Rule CV-7(d), United States District Court, Western District of Texas (establishing 11-day time for response); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) provides for extension of time for good cause, with few exceptions.

⁸³ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(a)(emphasis added).

⁸⁴ *Larrea*, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10469 *21-23.

court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.⁸⁵

4. Discovery Stay – for “Good Cause.”

When the motion to dismiss is filed, it operates to immediately suspend all discovery in the underlying legal action until the court rules on the motion to dismiss.⁸⁶ This appears to be an automatic suspension that requires no further order of the court. There is no requirement in the statute that the motion to dismiss include a notice to court and parties about the discovery suspension. The suspension of discovery would apparently refer to all discovery, including that unrelated to communication litigation. Nor is there any provision in the statute for remedies in the event that parties attempt to conduct discovery without leave of court, or whether the discovery stay applies to the entire case, if the motion to dismiss applies only to certain causes of action.

On a showing of good cause, (very) limited discovery may be allowed on issues relevant to the motion to dismiss, based on a motion by the court or a party.⁸⁷ Since the motion must be heard within 60 days of the service of the motion, and the new statute does not address whether the deadlines in the Rules of Civil Procedure may be modified, discovery is likely limited to depositions, possibly with production of some record production, unless the opponent refuses to waive the response times contemplated in TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.2 and 199.2(5). Although the amendments to Section 27.004 to extend the hearing date from 30 to 60 days, and to allow an extension up to 120 days to permit discovery are helpful, such amendments do not cure limited discovery concerns. Since the statute provides for discovery only by discretionary order of the court, the order for discovery will have to modify normal discovery deadlines, and parties will still have to be very mindful of the limited extension under Section 27.004(c).⁸⁸

There is no provision for when a motion for discovery may be brought, whether a movant is entitled to hearing, what information or evidence may be considered, or how the court may respond to such a

motion. There still does not appear to be any authority for a trial court to extend hearing deadlines further than 120 days in order to permit discovery for reasons unique to the parties, such as illness, incarceration, or any other reason that would normally constitute “good cause.” What constitutes “good cause” is unclear.⁸⁹ One recent case held that good cause did not exist when the party seeking depositions in a malicious prosecution case “stated no good cause for the discovery in his emergency motion for expedited discovery.”⁹⁰ Simply stating in a hearing and mandamus response that prior depositions already confirmed subject statements as false, and that additional, limited depositions were needed in order to defend the motion to dismiss, was insufficient to show good cause.⁹¹

The effective result of a discovery stay is to take reputational tort suits out of the mainstream of civil litigation. A discovery stay that leaves to the discretion of the trial court whether any discovery will occur arguably means that a reputational tort plaintiff, unlike all other plaintiffs, must have all evidence in admissible form on every element of every cause of action before filing suit. If so, this turns civil litigation on its head. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permit parties to make alternative claims for relief or defense,⁹² and do not require a claimant to have amassed by the time of filing suit all evidence necessary to prevail at trial. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court, in adopting the Rules of Civil Procedure, allocated 15 of the 330 rules generally applicable in county and district courts to the discovery not just of admissible evidence, but of information that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”⁹³ Few trial lawyers are likely to claim or admit that their case was fully developed prior to filing suit, that fairly substantial evidence is at hand on every element of every cause of action, and that no discovery was necessary to prove the case. For more than 150 years Texas jurisprudence has dealt with the scope of discovery available to parties as they seek to flesh out their cases. Why, then, have the reputational torts been singled out for such extraordinary treatment in the TCPA?

A plaintiff may argue that such denial of discovery, especially coupled with the expedited

⁸⁵ *Kinney v. BCG Attorney Search*, No. 03-12-00579-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 (Austin August 21, 2013, no pet. h.).

⁸⁶ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(c).

⁸⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(b).

⁸⁸ See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.004. See also *Larrea*, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10469 *10-11, 21-22 (finding an order allowing limited discovery and providing for a continuation of the hearing did not constitute a “ruling” to comply with the 30-day deadline, therefore resulting in the motion to dismiss being overruled by operation of law).

⁸⁹ The Waco Court of Appeals did not discuss reasons for requested discovery, but only noted that the “trial court concluded that there was no good cause for discovery....” *Ramsey*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5554 *11.

⁹⁰ *In re D.C.*, No. 05-13-00944-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10006 *3 (Tex. App. Dallas August 9, 2013)(mem. op.).

⁹¹ *Id.*

⁹² TEX. R. CIV. P. 48.

⁹³ TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a).

minimum notice dispositive motion, may very well violate the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution, as discussed below.

D. Standards and Burdens of Proof/Actions by Court.

1. What Evidence May be Considered?

“In determining whether a legal action should be dismissed under [the TCPA], the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based.”⁹⁴ The TCPA does not clearly indicate whether the hearing is evidentiary, or whether the trial court may consider live testimony or take up the motion by submission. Although the Act specifically refers to affidavits and pleadings that must be considered, the Legislature does not prohibit live testimony or documents offered at hearing. The statute is silent about the admission of live testimony and other evidence at the hearing. The Legislature is quite capable of using qualifying language such as “only consider” if it intended to prohibit a full evidentiary hearing. Yet the language of the statute may leave open an argument to a movant that a respondent is limited to affidavit testimony, although a plaintiff resisting the motion to dismiss may very well desire to bring live testimony at the hearing, because of the discovery limitations. One media defendant has argued that the hearing is non-evidentiary.⁹⁵ At least one case discusses testimony and evidence introduced at the hearing without complaint that the hearing is non-evidentiary.⁹⁶ The hearing must be at least partially evidentiary, to the extent that the trial court will have to consider evidence on what constitutes “reasonable attorney’s fees, and other expenses.”⁹⁷ The statute makes no other provision for how the trial court is to determine such amounts, which may be contested, other than to be heard with the motion to dismiss. If the hearing is evidentiary on fees and costs, a record will still be necessary, so there is no logical reason why the court could not consider evidence in addition to the pleadings and affidavits on the merits of the motion.

There is no time limit for the hearing. Nor does the statute provide for any continuance of the hearing once it commences.

2. Burden of Proof on the Movant.

The standard for the defendant bringing the motion to dismiss is “preponderance of the evidence.” The movant need only show by a preponderance of the evidence “that the legal action is based on, relates to, or is in response to the party’s exercise of: (1) the right of free speech; (2) the right to petition; or (3) the right of association.”⁹⁸ Whether the movant meets that burden has been reviewed de novo as an application of law to facts.⁹⁹ In order to require a dismissal of the underlying legal action, there is no requirement that the movant obtain any finding that the action against him was frivolous or groundless and brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, despite the avowed intent of the statute, or otherwise was brought for the purpose of harassing or maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of First Amendment rights. Importantly, the Legislature did not condition the application of the TCPA on a finding of improper motive by the plaintiff. There is no *mens rea* requirement that the intent of the lawsuit be to chill free speech, petition or association. Nor is there a requirement under the statute that the trial court take into consideration any disparity in the resources available to the parties.

3. Burden of Proof on the Respondent.

Once the movant files a verified motion that merely asserts the statutory allegations, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff/respondent. There are crucial questions about what the burden of proof on the respondent is and how it is met. The court “may not dismiss a legal action under this section if the party bringing the legal action establishes by **clear and specific** evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.”¹⁰⁰ What does that mean? What must a respondent do to defeat a motion to dismiss?

a. “Clear and Specific Evidence” is Still Undefined in Texas Civil Litigation Burden of Proof.

It is not clear what the Legislature meant by “clear and specific evidence,” as there is no such recognized standard under Texas law for any cause of action. We anticipate immediate confusion of that standard with “clear and convincing evidence,” which is the highest civil evidentiary standard to meet with a long history of interpretation.¹⁰¹ The standard should

⁹⁴ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a).

⁹⁵ See *Larrea*, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10469 *10 (counsel for Univision objected to an email being admitted into evidence at hearing “because the statute makes it quite clear that this is not to be an evidentiary hearing.”).

⁹⁶ See *Ramsey*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5554*7.

⁹⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(a)(1).

⁹⁸ *Id.* § 27.005(b).

⁹⁹ *Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS *8.

¹⁰⁰ *Id.* § 27.005(c) (emphasis added).

¹⁰¹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.001(2): “Clear and convincing” means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

not mean anything other than *some* evidence of each element; otherwise, the Act would impermissibly impose a higher burden of proof that would ultimately be required of a plaintiff at the trial of the legal action. Yet this is exactly what the drafter intended.

“Clear and specific evidence” is evidently derived from the reporter’s privilege codified in 2009 in the “Journalists’ Qualified Testimonial Privilege in Civil Proceedings” in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE CHAPTER 22, SUBCHAPTER C, in which a party seeking to compel information from a reporter must make a “clear and specific showing” about the need to obtain the information. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.024. The “clear and specific showing” does not apply to any cause of action, or a burden of proof for any right of action for damages.

The Chapter 27 cases reported to date often refer to the phrase, but do not define it.¹⁰² None of the reported cases have yet addressed a challenge to the use or definition of the phrase, though one notes that the statute does not define “what sort of evidence satisfies the ‘clear and specific’ qualitative standard....”¹⁰³ The question should be what “quantum,” and not “type,” of proof satisfies the standard.

The First Court of Appeals in Houston recently resorted to opening a dictionary to define parts of the phrase, but without reference to a standard of proof. That court found “clear” to mean “free from obscurity or ambiguity,” “easily understood,” “free from doubt,” or “sure.”¹⁰⁴ The court also defined “specific” to mean “constituting or falling into a specifiable category,” “free from ambiguity,” or “accurate.”¹⁰⁵ The court also looked to an opinion from the Fourteenth Court, which misquoted a 1971 case that has not been cited by any other case regarding “clear and specific evidence” in the last 42 years.¹⁰⁶ No

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.

¹⁰² The Dallas Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he TCPA does not define ‘clear and specific evidence.’” *Larrea*, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10469 *27.

¹⁰³ *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975 *12.

¹⁰⁴ *John Moore Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 *14, quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 229 (11th ed. 2003), and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 287 (9th ed. 2009) (“unambiguous,” “sure,” or “free from doubt.”). Five days earlier, the same court looked to the 8th edition of BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY for the same definitions. *KTRK Television, Inc. v. Robinson*, No. 01-12-00372, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8463 *15 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] July 11, 2013, no pet. h.).

¹⁰⁵ *John Moore Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 *15, quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY AT 1198.

¹⁰⁶ *John Moore Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 *15, citing *Rehak Creative Servs. v. Witt*, No. 14-12-00658-CV,

cases have reviewed “clear and specific evidence” as a standard of proof, or compared the level of proof to preponderance of the evidence.

- b. If “Clear And Specific Evidence” is Meant to be a Higher Standard of Proof Than “Preponderance of the Evidence,” it May Very Well Violate the Open Courts Provision of the Texas Constitution.

Ms. Prather, writing for the Texas Daily Newspaper Association, gave her detailed explanation of the TCPA, including her view of what constitutes “clear and specific evidence.” She wrote: “**What is the “clear and specific” standard?** As many of you may recall, it is the standard already used by the courts in reporter’s privilege cases and is a more significant burden than establishing something by a preponderance of the evidence but not as heavy a burden as requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence.”¹⁰⁷ A “clear and specific showing” to obtain a reporter’s source information is very different from meeting a burden of proof on a recognized tort common law cause of action.

At least one media party, relying only upon pieced together definitions of “clear” and “specific,” argues that “clear and specific” is an intermediate burden of proof that is greater than the preponderance of the evidence.¹⁰⁸ Other briefing struggles to find a workable definition of the term.

If indeed “clear and specific evidence” is supposed to represent a “more significant burden” than a “preponderance of the evidence,” the statute may very well run afoul of the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution.¹⁰⁹

2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 6196 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2013, no pet. h.), which purported to quote from *McDonald v. Clemens*, 464 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1971, no writ) for the proposition that “Clear and specific evidence” has been described as evidence that is “unaided by presumptions, inferences, or intendments.” However, the court in *McDonald* actually stated that “Charges of fraud must be established by clear and specific evidence unaided by presumptions, inferences or intendments,” with no citations to any authorities. 464 S.W. 2d at 456. No cases other than *Rehak* has ever cited that statement from the Tyler Court of Appeals.

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.sdma.com/texas-newsrooms-will-benefit-from-anti-slapp-law-07-15-2011/>.

¹⁰⁸ Brief of Univision, *Virgilio Avil and Univision Television Group, Inc. v. Larrea*, No. 05-11-01637, Court of Appeals of Dallas, Texas.

¹⁰⁹ The “open courts provision” of the Texas Constitution provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; *Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc.*, 889 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. 1994). “It includes at least

There is at least one case pending on appeal in which the constitutionality of the imposition of a higher burden of proof in response to a motion to dismiss has been challenged.¹¹⁰ The statute in question clearly applies to many established common law causes of action, and if Ms. Prather's view as non-legislative author of the statute is correct, a party must meet a higher burden of proof to defeat a motion to dismiss filed at the outset of a case without discovery than the preponderance standard required to prove the case at trial. Preponderance of the evidence is the long-standing burden of proof in most common-law and many statutory causes of action.

Likewise, imposing a higher standard of proof in response to a motion to dismiss would seem to impose a higher burden than is required to defeat a no-

three separate constitutional guarantees: 1) courts must actually be operating and available; 2) the Legislature cannot impede access to the courts through unreasonable financial barriers, and 3) meaningful remedies must be afforded, 'so that the legislature may not abrogate the right to assert a well-established common law cause of action unless the reason for its action outweighs the litigants' constitutional right of redress.'" *Trinity River Auth.*, 889 S.W.2d at 262. Pursuant to the open courts provision, "[a] statute or ordinance that unreasonably abridges a justiciable right to obtain redress for injuries caused by the wrongful acts of another amounts to a denial of due process under article I, section 13, and is, therefore, void." *Sax v. Votteler*, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1983). Thus, the open courts provision is violated when a well-established cause of action is restricted, and the restriction is unreasonable and arbitrary when balanced against the purpose of the statute. *Smith v. Smith*, 126 S.W.3d 660, 664 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.), citing *Sax*, 648 S.W.2d at 666. Clearly, causes of action for defamation, business disparagement, tortious interference, fraud, malicious prosecution, violations of consumer statutes, and other common-law and statutory actions are well-established. The TCPA may unreasonably and arbitrarily restrict well-established causes of action, by imposing a higher standard of proof than would ordinarily be required for the plaintiff to prevail at trial. Moreover, the TCPA's limitation on discovery may also violate the open courts provision. See *In re Hinterlong*, 109 S.W.3d 611 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2003, orig. proceeding) (crime-stoppers statutory privilege violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution, because it unreasonably and arbitrarily restricted plaintiff's ability to prosecute his malicious prosecution, defamation, and negligence claims, by precluding discovery of the identity and other information about his accuser).

¹¹⁰ See *Jennings v. Wallbuilder Presentations, Inc.*, 378 S.W.3d 519 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2012, pet. filed) (appeal of order denying motion dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). In another case, the First District Court of Appeals found that the respondent waived the argument due to failure to present it to the trial court. *Moore Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 *7 n.1.

evidence motion for summary judgment, which requires the respondent only to produce more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements.¹¹¹ A non-movant produces more than a scintilla when the evidence "rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions."¹¹² There is a very large body of law that describes for courts and practitioners what level of proof is necessary to sustain or defeat a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, none of which is deemed frivolous. The case law refers to a burden on the non-movant to "produce" such evidence. The TCPA requires the non-movant to "establish" the evidence. Considering the introduction of other standards in the statute, a movant could argue that "establish" also means more than "produce," perhaps rising to the level of evidence required to sustain a directed verdict. This also makes no sense and overwhelms any notion of fairness and harmony with existing law. Existing rules for summary judgment and against frivolous suits, when applied by even-handed jurists, provide a more than adequate framework for sorting out meritless suits involving some sort of speech.

c. What is a "Prima Facie Case?"

"The term '*prima facie* evidence' is ambiguous at best; it sometimes entitles the producing party to an instructed verdict, absent contrary evidence, and sometimes means that a party has produced sufficient evidence to go to the trier of fact on the issue."¹¹³ In this context, "prima facie" appears to refer to some evidence on the elements of the cause of action. The statute does not clarify what it means by "a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question."

In considering Chapter 27 motions to dismiss, the courts that have discussed the term "prima facie case" have looked to standard definitions. The First District Court of Appeals recently said that the term "implies a minimal factual burden: '[a] prima facie case represents the minimum quantity of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true.'"¹¹⁴ The Fort Worth Court of

¹¹¹ TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); *Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc.*, 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003).

¹¹² *Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgeway*, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).

¹¹³ *Hinojosa v. Columbia/St. David's Healthcare System, L.P.*, 106 S.W.3d 380, (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.), citing *Coward v. Gateway Nat'l Bank*, 525 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex. 1975).

¹¹⁴ *Crazy Hotel*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5407 *16, quoting *Rodriguez v. Printone Color Corp.*, 982 S.W.2d 69, 72

Appeals defines “prima facie” evidence as “the ‘minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true.’”¹¹⁵ Most civil courts will be familiar with a prima facie case in the context of evidence to support an application for a temporary injunction, in which the applicant must make a prima facie case, but need not prove that he will ultimately prevail.¹¹⁶ It is unclear why, in the context of the scope of evidence that a respondent must admit in support of each element of the causes of action, the Legislature referred to a prima facie case, rather than evidence, to describe proof for each element. Courts familiar with “prima facie case” will recognize the term to describe multiple elements or multiple causes of action, rather than evidence specific to a single element of a single cause of action. The cases describing the term under Chapter 27 already commingle the terms case and evidence, which will likely lead to additional confusion in the interpretation of the statute.

Ms. Prather likewise described to readers of her articles the origin of the prima facie case language: **“Where did the prima facie establishment of the elements of the claim come from?”** This is the test Texas courts currently use in determining whether someone has a valid claim to access information about an anonymous speaker. It only makes sense to apply the same test to all forms of speech — anonymous and non-anonymous, and Texas courts are used to applying this test in speech-related cases.”¹¹⁷

Ms. Prather’s comment does not address a cause of action, or the elements of a cause of action in civil litigation, and does not explain what proof of need for access to information has in common with proof of a cause of action consistent with due process.

It is probably more useful to practitioners to look for authority to non-media cases, particularly temporary injunction opinions to better understand what may constitute a prima facie case.

Since the respondent is required to provide “prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question”¹¹⁸ in response to the motion to dismiss, and will have to specifically brief on appeal

the evidence supporting each element,¹¹⁹ the prudent business disputes litigator should be familiar with the elements of defamation,¹²⁰ business disparagement,¹²¹ fraud,¹²² negligent misrepresentation,¹²³ and tortious interference,¹²⁴ at least.

¹¹⁹ *Wholesale TV*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 7348 *8-10.

¹²⁰ Defamation is a false and injurious impression of a plaintiff published without legal excuse. *Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc.*, 38 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. 2000); *Moore Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 *16. To maintain a defamation cause of action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant: (1) published a statement; (2) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff; (3) while acting with either actual malice, if the plaintiff was a public official or public figure, or with negligence, if the plaintiff was a private individual, regarding the truth of the statement. *WFAA-TV Inc. v. McLemore*, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998). Statements that are not verifiable as false cannot form the basis of a defamation claim. *Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.*, 497 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1990). Whether words are capable of the defamatory meaning the plaintiff attributes to them is a question of law for the court. *Carr v. Brasher*, 776 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex. 1989).

¹²¹ The elements of business disparagement are that (1) the defendant published false and disparaging information, (2) with malice, (3) without privilege, (4) that resulted in special damages to the plaintiff. *Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc.*, 124 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. 2003). “A business disparagement claim is similar in many respects to a defamation action.” *Id.* The two torts differ in the interest protected: a defamation claim protects an injured party’s personal reputation, while a business disparagement claim protects economic interests. *Id.*

¹²² A person commits fraud by (1) making a representation of material fact (2) that is false (3) and was known to be false or asserted recklessly without knowledge of its truth (4) with the intent that the misrepresentation be acted upon, and (5) the person to whom the misrepresentation is made justifiably relies upon it and (6) is injured as a result. *Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc.*, 297 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. 2009). The defendant’s acts or omissions must be a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury. *Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors Inc.*, 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998).

¹²³ “The elements of negligent misrepresentation are (1) the defendant made a representation in the course of its business or in a transaction in which it had an interest, (2) the defendant supplied false information for the guidance of others in their business, (3) the defendant did not exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information, and (4) the plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss by justifiably relying on the representation.” *Ostrovitz & Gwinn, LLC v. First Specialty Ins. Co.*, 393 S.W.3d 379, 397 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2012, no pet.).

¹²⁴ To establish a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a contract subject to interference exists, (2) the defendant committed a willful and intentional act of interference with the contract (3) the act proximately caused injury, and (4) the plaintiff sustained actual damages or loss. *ACS Investors, Inc. v.*

(Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); *Moore Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 *13-14.

¹¹⁵ *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975 *12, quoting *In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.*, 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004)(orig. proceeding)(citing *Tex. Tech Univ. Health Science Ctr. v. Apodaca*, 876 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. App. – El Paso 1994, writ denied)).

¹¹⁶ *See Henson v. Denison*, 546 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. Civ. App. – Fort Worth 1977, no writ).

¹¹⁷ <http://www.sdma.com/texas-newsrooms-will-benefit-from-anti-slapp-law-07-15-2011/>.

¹¹⁸ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §27.005(b)(c).

d. What About Non-Communication Claims Joined in the Same Lawsuit?

Another unanswered question is whether the motion to dismiss applies only to causes of action in a legal action based on a communication, or applies as well to non-communication causes of action. In business litigation, for example, conduct that gives rise to a breach of contract may precede emotionally based communications that form the basis of defamation or other torts. Since, under joinder rules,¹²⁵ and in the interest of judicial economy, an aggrieved party usually sues for all applicable causes of action against the offending party, the entire “legal action” could be the subject of the motion, regardless of whether each cause of action is based on speech rights.

It would certainly be more sensible for a motion to dismiss to target only the portions of a lawsuit related to the protected speech. “Legal action” does refer to “cause of action” in addition to “lawsuit ..., petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal or equitable relief”¹²⁶ but the statute does not limit its applicability to causes of action.

The issue is made more difficult to resolve in light of the statute’s provisions suspending “all discovery in the legal action,”¹²⁷ requiring dismissal of “a legal action,”¹²⁸ and permitting limited rights of appeal and writ of “a trial court order on a motion to dismiss a legal action” could certainly be interpreted by a trial court to halt discovery and require dismissal of even non-communication claims.

A real trap for the practitioner lies in the ambiguity of the scope of dismissal contemplated by the statute. Most good practitioners make alternative allegations in their lawsuits, most of which are supported by known evidence, and some of which are believed will be supported by the evidence adduced

during discovery. If the defendant moves to dismiss the entire suit, which includes all theories alleged and remedies sought, including extraordinary remedies, a movant may very well persuade the trial court to dismiss the entire lawsuit even if only one element of one of the causes of action is not clearly supported by evidence. As in Example 2, the remaining doctors seeking to preserve the protected health information of their patients may very well see their injunctive relief dissolved and the suit dismissed, and fees and sanctions awarded against them, even though the injunctive relief was clearly the proper remedy.

In light of the passage of the TCPA, and in the appropriate case, the prudent practitioner who represents the plaintiff, or defendant on a counterclaim, may consider whether to avoid joining related claims in the same suit. By the same token, such parties should consider whether to seek to sever¹²⁹ certain claims after the filing of a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss to preserve them and continue with discovery. The same practitioners should refresh their knowledge of the rules on compulsory and permissive counterclaims¹³⁰ and whether “actions involving a common question of law or fact” should be consolidated¹³¹ or proceed in separate trials.¹³²

4. Affirmative Defenses Are Now Considered.

The Legislature in 2013 added a provision that required the trial court to dismiss a legal action “if the moving party establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of a valid defense to the nonmovant’s claim.”¹³³ As we previously observed, prior to this amendment, the statute did not say that the respondent must meet any burden of proof or address any affirmative defenses or other dilatory pleadings. Yet in one recent decision, the Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence in light of the media defendant’s affirmative defense of “substantial truth” of the broadcast.¹³⁴ The court of appeals did not explain why, under the two-pronged analysis, there should be any discussion of an affirmative defense, when the respondent’s burden relates to a “prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.”¹³⁵ By definition, an affirmative defense is not an “essential element” of any claim. It is unclear why this provision was added to the statute in the latest legislative session.

McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997). Similarly, to establish a cause of action for tortious interference with prospective business relationships, a plaintiff must show that (1) there was a reasonable probability that the parties could have entered into a business relationship; (2) the defendant committed an independently tortious or unlawful act that prevented the relationship from occurring; (3) the defendant either acted with a conscious desire to prevent the relationship from occurring or knew the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of the conduct; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm or damages as a result of the defendant’s interference. *Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. Mercer, Inc.*, 213 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

¹²⁵ TEX. R. CIV. P. 51.

¹²⁶ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §27.001(6).

¹²⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §27.003(c).

¹²⁸ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §27.005(b)(c).

¹²⁹ TEX. R. CIV. P. 41.

¹³⁰ TEX. R. CIV. P. 97.

¹³¹ TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(a).

¹³² TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(b).

¹³³ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §27.005(d).

¹³⁴ *Larrea*, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10469 *25-27, *passim*.

¹³⁵ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c).

More recently, the Austin Court of Appeals rendered a post-2013 amendments decision that addressed, among other things, whether affirmative defenses were to be considered in the motion to dismiss and response.¹³⁶ This case was the second of two suits filed by BCG against Kinney, a legal recruiter, related to a prior employment relationship between the two and some later online comments by Kinney about BCG. The first suit was filed in California and resulted in Kinney obtaining \$45,000 in fees and expenses against BCG under California's anti-SLAPP law.¹³⁷ Facing a subsequent suit in Texas arising from the same facts, Kinney moved to dismiss under Chapter 27 and sought sanctions, and asserted that the claim was barred by *res judicata*. The court of appeals agreed, and curiously declined to determine whether the 2013 amendments applied retroactively, instead finding that Section 27.006's requirement that the trial court consider "the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based..."¹³⁸ could serve as the basis for consideration of affirmative defenses. No other cases or commentators have suggested that the statute could be so interpreted. Whether such a strained reading of the provision will affect any other cases in the appellate process remains to be seen, but it must be noted here.

5. Ruling by the Court – Dismissal Mandatory.

If the movant/defendant meets her modest burden, the court has no discretion, but "*shall dismiss*" the legal action brought against the movant/defendant. This is an important provision, as it seems to make the trial court's decision nondiscretionary, so long as the nonmovant does not "establish" "clear and specific evidence" on *some* element of *any* cause of action.

Unlike the provisions in Rule 13 and Chapters 9 and 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, there is no statutory requirement of any written finding in support of the trial court's ruling. If the movant makes no request for any findings under Section 27.007, the trial court does not have to issue any. At the request of the movant, but not the respondent, the court "shall issue" findings about whether the legal action was brought for improper purposes, and must issue the findings not later than 30 days following the request.¹³⁹ The Legislature does not provide a time limitation or end date on the request, and does not indicate whether the request should be made before or

after a ruling, or if the request can be made months or years later. The Legislature does not explain why the party bringing the legal action is not entitled to ask for such specific findings in the event that the trial court rules that the legal action should be dismissed. More importantly, the Legislature did not address what relevance, if any, such findings would have to the trial court or to an appellate court. If it is not an element of the motion that there be a finding that the lawsuit was brought for an improper purpose, then why is the movant permitted to request such findings? The motion can and must be granted so long as the other elements are met. If the Legislature intended such findings to assist in the determination of sanctions by the trial court, and the review of such award by the appellate court, such intent is less than clear from the text of the statute.

Another issue of concern is whether the trial court must rule on the motion if the plaintiff non-suits the case. Normally counterclaims and certain requests for sanctions survive a non-suit, but the motion to dismiss is not a counterclaim for damages, nor is it a motion for sanctions. The non-suit is effective as soon as the plaintiff files a motion for non-suit.¹⁴⁰ At the same time, a non-suit does not affect any pending claim for affirmative relief or motion for attorney's fees or sanctions. *Id.*; TEX. R. CIV. P. 162. A non-suit renders the merits of the case moot.¹⁴¹ Since the TCPA motion to dismiss is predicated on a review of the merits of the lawsuit, does the motion constitute a claim for affirmative relief or sanctions? Arguably the non-suit renders the motion to dismiss moot.¹⁴²

The practitioner should be very careful, however, to read a January 2013 decision from the Texas Supreme Court, which held that an engineer's motion to dismiss a case under Chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code was a claim for affirmative relief that survived a nonsuit.¹⁴³ The case has not been extended to a Chapter 27 case, but it is not a long path to travel.

¹⁴⁰ *Epps v. Fowler*, 351 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex. 2011).

¹⁴¹ *UTMB v. Estate of Blackmon*, 195 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. 2006).

¹⁴² The only non-suit issue to arise so far in a reported opinion was raised by a litigant in a mandamus proceeding, but the issue was not reached because the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals determined that an appeal from a final judgment, rather than mandamus, was appropriate. *In re Theusen*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4636*3-5.

¹⁴³ *CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood Homeowner's Ass'n*, 390 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Tex. 2013).

¹³⁶ *Kinney v. BCG Attorney Search*, No. 03-12-00579-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 (Austin August 21, 2013, no pet. h.).

¹³⁷ *Id.*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 *3-5.

¹³⁸ *Kinney*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 *21 (emphasis added by court).

¹³⁹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §27.007(a,b).

E. Mandatory, Not Discretionary, Award of Fees and Sanctions for Movant Upon Dismissal of Legal Action.

If the court dismisses a legal action, again the court has no discretion, but “*shall* award to the moving party: (1) court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other expenses incurred in defending against the legal action as justice and equity may require; and (2) sanctions against the party who brought the legal action as the court determines sufficient to deter the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar actions described in this chapter.”¹⁴⁴ There is no explanation in the legislative history or the statute why the trial court has been stripped of the discretion to award fees and assess sanctions, which discretion has long been given to courts. Even a suit with significant merit can result in fees and sanctions assessed if the court does not think that there is “clear and specific evidence.”

Chapter 27 sanctions also differ from those available under Rule 13 or Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, since Chapter 27 order does not expressly require the trial court to explain how it reached its determination.¹⁴⁵ There is nothing in the legislative history to explain why, in virtually all other civil litigation, a litigant is entitled to an explanation of the reason for the sanctions, but a plaintiff in a suit who receives a Section 27.009 does not.

The Austin Court of Appeals recently found no abuse of discretion in the award of \$75,000 in sanctions, without any evidence of the amount of time or fees charged, and with no finding that a lesser sanction would not have served the purpose of deterrence.¹⁴⁶ It was obvious that both the trial court and court of appeals were heavily influenced by the resolution of the California litigation in favor of Kinney with \$45,000 in sanctions,¹⁴⁷ but it is unclear whether the \$75,000 was essentially a double recovery for the California litigation.¹⁴⁸ Although the Austin Court of Appeals made a slight attempt to harmonize

their support of the large sanctions award with prior case law under Chapter 10, the Texas Supreme Court has made it clear in reviewing sanctions across a wide spectrum, including Tex. R. Civ. P. 215, that “a sanction cannot be excessive nor should it be assessed without appropriate guidelines.”¹⁴⁹ The more prudent approach for a movant seeking sanctions would be to provide evidence and briefing consistent with the developed body of Texas sanctions law.

The Legislature did not follow the lead of some other states and allow for the recovery of exemplary or punitive damages. An award of sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while Texas law provides a strict, high standard of proof to recover exemplary damages.¹⁵⁰ The legislative history and bill analyses do not discuss why the Legislature chose sanctions over punitive damages.

It appears that the amount of fees awarded will be reviewed in the usual manner, and that, absent controverting testimony, the fee award will withstand legal and factual sufficiency challenges.¹⁵¹

F. Award of Fees, Not Sanctions, for Respondent/Plaintiff – Predicated on Frivolous Motion.

In contrast to the broad recovery favoring the subject of the legal action, the only recovery that a plaintiff/respondent in the action may obtain in responding to a motion to dismiss would be for court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, but only if the court finds that the motion to dismiss is “frivolous or solely intended to delay.”¹⁵² Unlike the movant, the respondent cannot recover sanctions under Chapter 27, and would have to resort to existing Texas law to recover any sanctions for frivolous pleadings. The Legislature did not disclose why the plaintiff in the civil action must prove that the motion to dismiss is frivolous, while the object of the suit, the purported defamer, need only prove the action “relates to” his claimed exercise of speech, association, and petition rights.

G. Appellate Review.

1. Interlocutory Appeal: What is Reviewable?

What type of appeal is available to litigants of a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss has been the primary topic of discussion and motions in the cases making their way through the appellate system. It appears that although the Legislature devoted a separate section of the statute to “Appeal,”¹⁵³ the scope of interlocutory

¹⁴⁴ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(a).

¹⁴⁵ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.005 requires that a “court shall describe in an order imposing a sanction under this chapter the conduct the court has determined violated Section 10.001 and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 directs that “[n]o sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order.”

¹⁴⁶ *Kinney*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 * 30-35.

¹⁴⁷ *Kinney*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 * 31-34.

¹⁴⁸ The court of appeals noted that “there was sufficient evidence of the economic impact to Kinney of the sanctionable conduct of BCG over the course of litigation in two states to serve as a ‘guidepost’ for the amount of the sanction.” *Kinney*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 * 33-34.

¹⁴⁹ *Low v. Henry*, 221 S.W.3d 609, 620 (Tex. 2007).

¹⁵⁰ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003.

¹⁵¹ See *Ramsey*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5554*7.

¹⁵² TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(b).

¹⁵³ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008.

appeal was limited. Although the majority of appellate issues prior to the 2013 amendments addressed what denials of motions to dismiss were subject to interlocutory appeals, a recent case found that the “statute makes no appellate provisions regarding motions for extension of time to file a motion to dismiss,” therefore depriving an appellate court of jurisdiction to hear such an appeal.¹⁵⁴

The initial purpose of the 2013 amendments was to clearly provide for interlocutory appeals from any denial of motions to dismiss, whether by operation of law or order. The granting of a motion to dismiss, even of a portion of a case, is not subject to an interlocutory appeal.

Following the 2013 amendments, an allowable interlocutory appeal from an order denying a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss stays all other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal,¹⁵⁵ joining, among other things, cases in which media defendants are involved, a signed order denying a motion for summary judgment would result in a stay of the trial, though possibly not other proceedings.¹⁵⁶

Although generally “courts presume that the legislature intends statutes and amendments to operate prospectively unless they are expressly made retroactive,”¹⁵⁷ the Austin Court of Appeals found that the amendment to the statute does not apply when it “is procedural, remedial, or jurisdictional because such statutes generally do not affect vested rights.”¹⁵⁸ Since the amendments add rights of interlocutory appeal, and do not take away or impair vested rights, the Austin Court of Appeals found that they should be applied in cases pending when the statute is enacted, and therefore applied to the appeal.¹⁵⁹ Although the ruling will have limited application, the reasoning about current application of the amendments bears closer scrutiny for those cases currently making their way through the courts.

a. Denial of Motion to Dismiss by Operation of Law: Interlocutory Appeal is Clearly Available.

Chapter 27 confers explicit statutory jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal if the trial court does not timely rule on a motion to dismiss, so that “the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of law

and the moving party may appeal.”¹⁶⁰ As noted above, without a finding that “docket conditions” required a hearing outside the thirty days, the ruling is untimely and Section 27.008(a) jurisdiction over the appeal exists.¹⁶¹

b. Timely Written Denial of Motion to Dismiss – an Interlocutory Appeal is Available for Any Order That “Denies a Motion to Dismiss” Filed Under Section 27.003.

Resolving a significant split of authority on whether a Chapter 27 movant may take an interlocutory appeal from a written order denying the motion, the Legislature placed the grant of interlocutory jurisdiction with the other general rules for interlocutory appeals, in Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.¹⁶² Now, if there is a timely written order denying the motion to dismiss, the movant may pursue an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014. It is unclear why the Legislature permitted written orders denying motions to dismiss to be appealed under Section 51.014, while leaving motions overruled by operation of law appealable only under Section 27.008.

Since the 2013 legislative amendments were primarily meant to allow interlocutory appeals of all orders denying motions to dismiss, the development of the split of authority still warrants a review.

c. Cases Finding No Jurisdiction to Hear Interlocutory Appeal from Untimely Written Order Denying Motion to Dismiss.

The principal case that led to the 2013 legislative amendments was an opinion of the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, which decided that interlocutory appeals lie only for motions to dismiss overruled by operation of law, and not where a timely written order overruling the Chapter 27 motion to dismiss exists,¹⁶³ finding that “the interlocutory appeal statutorily authorized by subsection (a) is limited to situations in which a trial court has failed to timely rule on a timely-filed motion to dismiss, and the motion to

¹⁵⁴ *Summersett v. Jaiyeola*, No. 13-12-004442-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8882 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi-Edinburg, July 18, 2013, no pet. h.).

¹⁵⁵ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §51.014(b).

¹⁵⁶ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §51.014(a)(6),(b).

¹⁵⁷ *Kinney*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 * 11, citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.022; *City of Austin v. Whittington*, 384 S.W.3d 766, 790 (Tex. 2012).

¹⁵⁸ *Whittington*, 384 S.W.3d at 790.

¹⁵⁹ *Kinney*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 * 12-13.

¹⁶⁰ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(a).

¹⁶¹ *Crazy Hotel*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5407*14-15.

¹⁶² See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(12).

¹⁶³ *Jennings v. Wallbuilder Presentations, Inc.*, 378 S.W.3d 519 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2012, pet. filed) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction); see also *Lipsky v. Range Production Co., et al.*, No. 02-12-00098-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7059 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 23, 2012, pet. filed)(mem. op.)(dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction for same reason, but granting motion to consider the proceeding as a petition for writ of mandamus).

dismiss is therefore considered to have been denied by operation of law.”¹⁶⁴

Appellate courts generally have jurisdiction only over final judgments unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal.¹⁶⁵ Jurisdiction of a court of appeals is controlled by the constitution and by statutory provisions; an interlocutory order is not appealable unless a statute explicitly provides for appellate jurisdiction.¹⁶⁶ “Jurisdiction over an interlocutory order when not expressly authorized ... by statute is jurisdictional fundamental error.”¹⁶⁷

The Fort Worth Court of appeals correctly noted that “[s]tatutes authorizing interlocutory appeals are strictly construed because they are a narrow exception to the general rule that interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable.”¹⁶⁸ A TCPA order of dismissal is not among the types of actions for which an interlocutory appeal was then available under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §51.014. Section 27.008’s specific grant of right to appeal refers only to denial of the motion to dismiss by operation of law only, and permits appeal only by the moving party.¹⁶⁹

Although Section 27.008(b) refers to expediting an appeal “from a trial court order on a motion to dismiss a legal action,” the statute still does not explicitly state that the denial of a motion permits an interlocutory appeal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals correctly noted that the Legislature did not use any language in Chapter 27 creating a right of interlocutory appeal in the event that an order was signed.¹⁷⁰ Section 27.008(b) does not use the type of language found in other statutes creating interlocutory appeals, and it does not state that a party may appeal or is entitled to appeal.¹⁷¹ Without intervention by the

Legislature in 2013, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals’ analysis was formidable.

- d. Cases Finding There is Jurisdiction to Hear Interlocutory Appeal from Untimely Written Order Denying Motion to Dismiss.

More recent cases have held that Section 27.008 “permits an interlocutory appeal when the trial court denies the defendant’s motion by written order.”¹⁷² Although the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that the TCPA did not apply to an amended petition in a suit that predated the effective date of the TCPA, and therefore did not apply to the instant suit,¹⁷³ the court engaged in a lengthy analysis of interlocutory jurisdiction from a Chapter 27 order denying a motion to dismiss.¹⁷⁴ Rather than determining first that the TCPA did not apply to the case, the court stated that the movants “perfected this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss.”¹⁷⁵

The court’s analysis is perplexing, because if the TCPA does not apply to the case, then any limited grant of interlocutory appeal would not apply, either. The court quoted the proper authorities on limited interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, but did not discuss how the court could exercise jurisdiction if the TCPA did not apply. The court’s opinion is likely of very little precedential value, since the discussion in the abstract of jurisdiction most likely must be considered *dicta*.

The analysis of the court of appeals focused on giving meaning to language in Section 27.008(b) and (c), much the same as the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in the *Beacon Hill* case, discussed below.¹⁷⁶ The court correctly noted that “courts are not empowered to ‘fix’ the mistake [in legislation] by disregarding direct and clear statutory language that does not create an absurdity.”¹⁷⁷ The court believed that no allowing an interlocutory of written orders granting or denying a motion to dismiss “creates an absurdity by drawing an artificial distinction within the class of defendants the TCPA was designed to protect regardless of whether they suffered the harm for (sic) which the legislature

¹⁶⁴ *Wallbuilder*, 378 S.W.3d at 524.

¹⁶⁵ *Wallbuilder*, 378 S.W.3d at 522, citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6; *CMH Homes v. Perez*, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447-48 (Tex. 2011).

¹⁶⁶ *Stary v. DeBord*, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-353 (Tex. 1998); *Wallbuilder*, 378 S.W.3d at 522.

¹⁶⁷ *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081*7, quoting *N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez*, 799 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1990). Although the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found that interlocutory appellate jurisdiction existed over a timely written order denying a motion to dismiss, such finding is probably *dicta* and of little precedential value, since the court found that the TCPA did not retroactively apply to the suit. *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081*18.

¹⁶⁸ *Wallbuilder*, 378 S.W.3d at 522., quoting *CMH Homes v. Perez*, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011).

¹⁶⁹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(a).

¹⁷⁰ *Wallbuilder*, 378 S.W.3d at 525.

¹⁷¹ *Wallbuilder*, 378 S.W.3d at 525.

¹⁷² *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081*15.

¹⁷³ *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081*19.

¹⁷⁴ If the TCPA did not apply to the case, then how does appellate jurisdiction exist under the TCPA?

¹⁷⁵ *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081*5.

¹⁷⁶ See *Direct Commercial Funding, Inc. v. Beacon Hill Estates*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1898, discussed in Section III.G.2.i, *infra*.

¹⁷⁷ *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081*12.

addressed by enacting the TCPA.”¹⁷⁸ Finally, the court of appeals felt that it could depart from the general rule that “statutes conferring interlocutory appeals are strictly construed”¹⁷⁹ because of the legislature’s instruction “to liberally construe the TCPA in order ‘to effectuate its purpose and intent fully.’”¹⁸⁰

The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals has been joined by the First, Fourteenth, and Fifth Courts of Appeals in reaching the conclusion that, prior to the statutory amendments, Section 27.008 permitted an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s written order denying a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss.¹⁸¹

Without action by the Legislature there existed a conflict among the courts of appeals that would likely have permitted the Texas Supreme Court to exercise conflicts jurisdiction¹⁸² to decide the scope of interlocutory appeal.

e. Mandamus.

Now that the Legislature has resolved the issue of interlocutory appealability of denials of motions to dismiss, what significance do writs of mandamus or “other writs” have?¹⁸³ A mandamus is contemplated in the language of the statute: an “appellate court shall expedite an appeal *or other writ*”¹⁸⁴ Upon review, the appellate court will determine whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion,¹⁸⁵ and a trial court’s application of legal principles is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion separately from its resolution of factual disputes.¹⁸⁶

In the mandamus review of the trial court’s order, the court of appeals reviews the trial court’s legal determinations *de novo*.¹⁸⁷ “A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to analyze the law correctly or misapplies the law to established facts.”¹⁸⁸ Further, “a trial court’s erroneous legal conclusion, even in an unsettled area of law, is an abuse of discretion.”¹⁸⁹ The court also found that whether a *prima facie* case has been presented is a question of law for the court.¹⁹⁰

Still, “when the issues before the trial court necessarily require factual determinations, the court of appeals abuses its discretion when it resolves those issues in an original mandamus proceeding.”¹⁹¹ “Absent extraordinary circumstances ... an interlocutory ruling on a motion to dismiss is incident to the ordinary trial process and should be challenged by appeal, not corrected by mandamus.”¹⁹²

In determining that the homeowners in an alleged fracking pollution case had no immediate appellate remedy by interlocutory appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that it “must carefully analyze the costs and benefits of granting mandamus relief.”¹⁹³ The court stated that in “consideration of whether an appellate remedy is adequate, we should consider whether mandamus review will spare litigants and the public the time and money wasted ‘enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.’”¹⁹⁴ Stating that the “legislature has determined that unmeritorious lawsuits subject to chapter 27 should be dismissed early in litigation, generally before parties must engage in discovery,” mandamus relief is often involved in “cases in which the very act of proceeding to trial ... would defeat the substantive right involved.”¹⁹⁵

¹⁷⁸ *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081 *13.

¹⁷⁹ *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081 *15, quoting *CMH Homes*, 340 S.W.3d at 447.

¹⁸⁰ *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081 *15, quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.011(b). In a footnote, the Corpus Christi Court stated that the court of appeals in *Jennings v. Wallbuilder* “did not address the legislature’s direction to liberally construe the TCPA.” *San Jacinto Title Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5081 *15, n.7.

¹⁸¹ See *Moore Services*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 *6; *KTRK Television*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8463 *13; *BH DFW*, 402 S.W.3d 299.

¹⁸² TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001(a)(2).

¹⁸³ *Wallbuilder*, 378 S.W.3d at 524; *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975*9 (the court of appeals earlier dismissed an appeal for want of jurisdiction, and allowed the defendants to challenge the propriety of the trial court’s order denying the dismissal actions through an original mandamus proceeding)(*Lipsky v. Range Prod. Co.*, No. 02-12-00098-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7059 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth Aug. 23, 2012, pet. filed)(mem. op.)).

¹⁸⁴ *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975*51, quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(b).

¹⁸⁵ *Walker v. Packer*, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1991).

¹⁸⁶ *Id.* at 839-840.

¹⁸⁷ *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975*10.

¹⁸⁸ *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975*10, citing *Iloff v. Iloff*, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011); *Cook v. Tom Brown Ministries, et al.*, 385 S.W.3d at 600.

¹⁸⁹ *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975*10-11, citing *In re United Scaffolding, Inc.*, 301 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Tex. 2010)(orig. proceeding).

¹⁹⁰ *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975*13.

¹⁹¹ *In re Thuesen*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4636*5-6, quoting *Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals*, 795 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex. 1990).

¹⁹² *In re Thuesen*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4636*6.

¹⁹³ *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975 * 51.

¹⁹⁴ *Id.*, quoting *In re Team Rocket, L.P.*, 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008)(orig. proceeding).

¹⁹⁵ *In re Lipsky*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4975 * 52, quoting *In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc.*, 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex. 2008)(orig. proceeding)(applying health care liability

The proceedings in the trial court are not suspended or stayed while the mandamus proceeds.

2. Motion to Dismiss Timely Granted -

a. May be Appealable Noninterlocutory Order.¹⁹⁶

The respondent to a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss must prepare for an expedited appeal in the event the motion is granted. The *Wallbuilder* case suggests that an order granting a motion to dismiss under Section 27.005 may be appealable as a final judgment, or severable and appealable as a final, non-interlocutory order disposing of all issues and all parties.¹⁹⁷ This may be true if the trial court dismisses the entire case, but may not be true if the order of dismissal targets only certain causes of action. Whether the dismissed causes and parties are severable for appeal will be decided on a case-by-case basis.

When some, but not all, of the defendants in a case file motions to dismiss that are granted, and motions to sever and enter final judgment as to those defendants are pending, a court of appeals may decline to exercise mandamus jurisdiction and find that an appeal of a final judgment provides a better remedy for a claim that the trial court erred in granting motions to dismiss.¹⁹⁸ “An appeal provides more complete review of an order disposing of a party’s claims than review by petition for writ of mandamus. An appellate court may not deal with disputed matters of fact in an original mandamus proceeding.”¹⁹⁹ It appears that the court of appeals found the mandamus action premature, though it is unclear from the record whether the appellant faced expiring Chapter 27 appellate deadlines while the motion to sever was pending.

We anticipate that an appeal of a final order will be reviewed for legal sufficiency.²⁰⁰

b. May be Appealable Interlocutory Order.

If the trial court timely grants an order dismissing claims of some, but not all, parties, the order is interlocutory and may be appealed, according to the

statute requiring sufficient expert reports to proceed with the case).

¹⁹⁶ An untimely order granting the motion to dismiss would be construed to overrule the motion as a matter of law.

¹⁹⁷ *Wallbuilder*, 378 S.W.3d at 524, citing *Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc.*, 875 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. 1994) (recognizing that trial court may “make the judgment final for purposes of appeal by severing the causes and parties”).

¹⁹⁸ *In re Thuesen*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4636*5-6.

¹⁹⁹ *In re Thuesen*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4636*5-6, quoting *Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals*, 795 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. 1990).

²⁰⁰ See *City of Keller v. Wilson*, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005).

Fourteenth Court of Appeals.²⁰¹ The court of appeals noted that although there was no express grant of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction from a signed order of dismissal, the court felt that the Legislatures’ command that Chapter 27 “shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose and intent fully,”²⁰² required finding interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. The argument that the court adopted is that failing to find interlocutory appellate jurisdiction from a signed order “renders portions of subsections (b) and (c) meaningless in contravention of statutory construction precepts.”²⁰³ The court looked to language in Section 27.008(b) about expediting “an appeal or other writ, whether interlocutory or not, from a trial court order on a motion to dismiss ... or from a trial court’s failure to rule”²⁰⁴ Finding that “[i]f no interlocutory appeal is available when the trial court expressly rules on a motion to dismiss by signing an order then the phrase ‘from a trial court order on a motion to dismiss’ appearing after the phrase ‘whether interlocutory or not’ is rendered meaningless.”²⁰⁵ Further, since subsection (c) “states that an appeal ‘must be filed on or before the 60th day after the date the trial court’s order is signed or the time prescribed by Section 27.005 expires, as applicable,’” the court of appeals found that if no signed order can be the subject of appeal, the language would be superfluous.²⁰⁶

This appears to be the principal countervailing argument to *Wallbuilder* in favor of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over Chapter 27 motions, in which there is a written order granting or denying the motion. The Texas Supreme Court has requested briefing on the merits in *Wallbuilder*, and if the court accepts the case it will likely work to clarify the scope of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.

The decision for the court to make will be whether the long-standing statutory construction precepts that grants of interlocutory jurisdiction are to be strictly construed, against a general statement at the end of the new statute that it is to be liberally construed in general. Since such language is commonly found in statutes, it is questionable whether it can be read to extend jurisdiction when Texas courts are historically very hesitant to decide cases without a clear grant of authority. Courts may be very reluctant to allow an expansive view of “liberally construction” to open gates to hear more cases.

²⁰¹ *Direct Commercial Funding, Inc. v. Beacon Hill Estates*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1898*8-9.

²⁰² *Beacon Hill*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1898*6, quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.011(b).

²⁰³ *Beacon Hill*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1898*8.

²⁰⁴ *Id.*

²⁰⁵ *Id.*

²⁰⁶ *Beacon Hill*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1898*10.

3. Deadlines for Chapter 27 Appeal or Writ.

Either party has 60 days after the court's order is signed or overruled by operation of law²⁰⁷ to actually file the appeal or writ, not just a notice of appeal, if the appeal or other writ is brought "under this section."²⁰⁸ The deadline for any other appeal or writ should be governed by applicable law.²⁰⁹

The statute is unclear as to what appeals or writs would be brought "under this section." Clearly an interlocutory appeal from a failure to rule on the motion is brought under Section 27.008(a). If a party files a petition for writ of mandamus, is it considered "under this section" for purposes of the filing deadline? Chapter 27 does not expand the jurisdiction of any appellate court. Since a mandamus action is an original proceeding, a strong argument can be made that the practitioner should look to and follow the existing deadlines under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.²¹⁰ This deadline issue has not yet been addressed.

What is the deadline to appeal if the motion to dismiss is granted, and an order disposing of all parties and claims is entered? Is that considered a final judgment, for which a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order,²¹¹ or does the 60-day filing of the appeal itself, regardless of notice, apply under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008? These questions are not addressed, let alone answered, in the statute, but a prudent practitioner should look first to the standard shorter notice of appeal deadlines. The question would be whether an appeal of an order of dismissal would be considered brought "under this section" for purposes of filing the appeal. Since any appeal is expedited, it is conceivable that the 60-day filing deadline may apply to actually filing the appeal of an order granting the motion. Presumably the reference in Section 27.008 (c) to "the trial court's order" is the order on the motion to dismiss, not another order, such as one on a motion to sever. The statute does not reconcile the expedited 60-day deadline with any other orders to render the trial court's order non-interlocutory and appealable.

²⁰⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(a)(A failure to timely rule is treated as a denial by operation of law to trigger the appellate deadline.); *see also Jain*, 395 S.W.3d at 396-397 (finding that deadlines and extension for perfecting an appeal under TEX. R. APP. P. 26 do not apply when a statute provides the times for perfecting appeal).

²⁰⁸ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(c).

²⁰⁹ *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1, 26.1.

²¹⁰ *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 52; TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 22.002, 22.221.

²¹¹ TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1.

4. Any Appeal or Writ From An Order On A Chapter 27 Motion to Dismiss Shall be Expedited.

Section 27.008(b) indicates that any appeal or writ is to be expedited. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that "the plain language and meaning of subsection (b) is to require expedited consideration by an appellate court of any appeals or other writs from a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss filed under Chapter 27, whether interlocutory or not."²¹² In other words, Section 27.008(b) "imposes a duty on the appellate courts to expedite disposition of any types of appeals or writs" from Chapter 27 motions to dismiss.²¹³ This likely means that an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014 should be expedited.

5. Standard of Review of Interlocutory Appeal.

The statute does not discuss the standard of review of the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss and for fees and sanctions. Although a trial court's resolution of questions turning on the application of legal standards is a de novo review, it is unclear whether the court's determination of whether the respondent met its burden of proof will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion²¹⁴ or legal and factual sufficiency.²¹⁵ No appellate courts have so far reviewed the trial court findings on an abuse of discretion standard in other than mandamus proceedings.

a. De Novo Review – Statutory Construction.

As Chapter 27 cases work their way through the appellate system, they will confront questions as to whether the several parts of the statute are ambiguous or unambiguous, and how the law is to be construed. Most Chapter 27 statutory construction issues to date have addressed appellate jurisdictional issues.

Any statutory construction is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.²¹⁶ When reviewing error under a de novo standard, the appellate court conducts an independent analysis of the record to arrive at its own legal conclusions, does not defer to the trial court's conclusions, and may substitute its conclusions

²¹² *Wallbuilder*, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 6834 *10.

²¹³ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(b).

²¹⁴ *See In re Doe*, 19 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2000).

²¹⁵ *See, e.g., King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman*, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003).

²¹⁶ *Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water*, 336 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2011); *Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers*, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009); *Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Public Util. Comm'n*, 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 1997).

for those made by the trial court.²¹⁷ In construing a statute, standard construction rules indicate that “[w]hen the Legislature has spoken on a subject, its determination is binding upon the courts unless the Legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority.”²¹⁸ “The courts are not free to thwart the plain intention of the Legislature expressed in a law that is constitutional.”²¹⁹

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts are to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.²²⁰ If the language in a statute is unambiguous, the court must seek the intent of the legislature as found in the plain and common meaning of the words and terms used.²²¹ In other words, “[w]here text is clear, text is determinative.”²²² At that point, “‘the judge’s inquiry is at an end,’ and extra textual forays are improper.”²²³

“In applying the plain and common meaning of the language in a statute, courts may not by implication enlarge the meaning of the statute beyond its ordinary meaning; such implication is inappropriate when legislative intent may be gathered from a reasonable interpretation of the statute as it is written.”²²⁴

“This text-based approach requires us to study the language of the specific section at issue, as well as the statute as a whole.”²²⁵ “Legislative intent remains the polestar of statutory construction.”²²⁶ If the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, the court adopts, with few exceptions, the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision’s words and terms.²²⁷ If a statute is unambiguous, rules of construction or other extrinsic aids cannot be used to create ambiguity.²²⁸ “As the Texas Supreme Court said long ago: ‘[w]hen the purpose of a legislative

enactment is obvious from the language of the law itself, there is nothing left to construction. In such case it is vain to ask the courts to attempt to liberate an invisible spirit, supposed to live concealed within the body of the law.’”²²⁹ When a statute is unambiguous, the court’s role is to apply it as written despite its imperfections.²³⁰ Ordinary citizens should be able to rely on the plain language of the statute to mean what it says.²³¹ Finally, a court is not to “interpret a statute in a manner that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous.”²³²

b. Legal Sufficiency Review.

Whether the movant met his initial very modest initial burden of proof or the respondent met the shifted burden of proof requires some analysis of the evidence, which likely consists of a legal sufficiency of evidence review on at least the first question.²³³ When reviewing a legal sufficiency issue, the Waco Court of Appeals stated that the court “must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable fact finder could and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable fact finder could not.”²³⁴ A no-evidence legal sufficiency standard is used to evaluate evidence supporting the fact finder’s determination of an issue on which the appellant did not have the burden of proof.²³⁵ A no-evidence challenge will be sustained if (1) there is no evidence supporting the challenged element, (2) the evidence offered to prove the challenged element is no more than a mere scintilla, (3) the evidence establishes the opposite of the challenged element, or (4) the court is barred by law or rules of evidence from considering the only evidence offered to prove the challenged element.²³⁶

In determining whether the nonmovant met its burden to present a prima facie case, the court reviews

²¹⁷ See *Quick v. City of Austin*, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998).

²¹⁸ *Public Utility Comm’n of Texas v. Cofer*, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. 1988).

²¹⁹ *National Surety Corp. v. Ladd*, 131 Tex. 295, 115 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. 1938).

²²⁰ *Fleming Foods of Tex. v. Rylander*, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999).

²²¹ *Sorokolit v. Rhodes*, 889 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. 1994).

²²² *In the Supreme Court of Texas*, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2013 Tex. LEXIS 180 *14, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 360 (2013), quoting *Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers*, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009).

²²³ *In the Supreme Court of Texas*, 2013 Tex. LEXIS 180*15, quoting *Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson*, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651-52 (Tex. 2006).

²²⁴ *Sorokolit*, 889 S.W.2d at 241.

²²⁵ *In the Supreme Court of Texas*, 2013 Tex. LEXIS 180 *14, citing *Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Systems*, 996 S.W.2d 864, 865-66 (Tex. 1999).

²²⁶ *Fitzgerald*, 996 S.W.2d at 865-66.

²²⁷ *Fitzgerald*, 996 S.W.2d at 865-66.

²²⁸ *Fitzgerald*, 996 S.W.2d at 865-66.

²²⁹ *Fitzgerald*, 996 S.W.2d at 865-66, quoting *Dodson v. Bunton*, 81 Tex. 655, 17 S.W. 507, 508 (Tex. 1891).

²³⁰ *Stockton v. Offenbach*, 336 S.W.3d 610, 619 (Tex. 2011).

²³¹ *Fitzgerald*, 996 S.W.2d at 865, citing *Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc.*, 322 U.S. 607, 618, 88 L.Ed. 1488, 64 S.Ct. 1215 (1944).

²³² *Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue*, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008).

²³³ See *City of Keller v. Wilson*, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005).

²³⁴ *Ramsey*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5554*3, citing *City of Keller*, 168 S.W.3d at 827.

²³⁵ See *Croucher v. Croucher*, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983).

²³⁶ *Service Corp. v. Guerra*, 348 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. 2011).

the pleadings and the evidence in a light favorable to the nonmovant.²³⁷

c. Factual Sufficiency Review.

Considering that factual sufficiency review is available only in the courts of appeals,²³⁸ it is unclear The Waco Court of Appeals also said that when “reviewing a challenge that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding, a reviewing court will set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all of the evidence in the record pertinent to that finding, the court determines that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside.”²³⁹

The prudent practitioner should challenge the trial court’s findings on both legal and factual sufficiency grounds until the scope of factual sufficiency review of findings on a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss is finally determined.

H. Does the TCPA Apply in Federal Court?

Although it is unsettled whether a defendant in federal court in Texas may file a TCPA motion to dismiss, recent authority suggests that the Texas anti-SLAPP dismissal motion may be unavailable in federal court sitting under either diversity or federal question jurisdiction. In a very thorough and well-reasoned opinion, a U.S. District Court sitting in the District of Columbia recently held that a very similar anti-SLAPP statute of the District of Columbia²⁴⁰ attempts to answer the same questions that Federal Rules 12²⁴¹ and 56²⁴² cover, and therefore cannot be applied in a federal court sitting in diversity.²⁴³ In so finding, Judge Robert Wilkins stated that the “history and practice culminating in the 1946 Amendments clearly demonstrates that the framers intended that Rules 12 and 56 provide the exclusive means for

challenging the merits of a plaintiff’s claim based on a defense either on the face of the pleadings or on matters outside the pleadings.”²⁴⁴ He stated, “[m]oreover, like the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 12 and 56 automatically apply in “all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.”²⁴⁵

The analysis was whether the federal rule, fairly construed, answers or covers the question in dispute.²⁴⁶ If the federal rule answers the question, the state law does not apply.²⁴⁷ In that case, the court determined that Federal Rules 12 and 56 answered the question in dispute, which was “whether this Court may dismiss 3M’s claims with prejudice on a preliminary basis based on the pleadings or on matters outside the pleadings merely because 3M has not ‘demonstrated that the claim is likely to succeed on the merits.’”²⁴⁸ Judge Wilkins observed that the D.C. “special motion to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP Act operates greatly to a defendant’s benefit by altering the procedure otherwise set forth in Rules 12 and 56 for determining a challenge to the merits of a plaintiff’s claim and by setting a higher standard upon the plaintiff to avoid dismissal.”²⁴⁹ The *Boulter* opinion rejected opinions from the First²⁵⁰ and Ninth²⁵¹ Circuit Courts of Appeals, finding them distinguishable or failing to apply the proper analysis.

In a recent second *Boulter* opinion, the same district court declined to vacate its prior decision at the request of the District of Columbia, finding “that the application of the D.C. Anti-SLAPP in federal court raises serious policy questions.”²⁵² Instead, the court found that it serves the public interest to keep on the books an opinion “that may contribute to the necessary and healthy debate of those questions.”²⁵³ The court pointed out that “the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act requires the trial court to dismiss claims, with prejudice, and prior to conducting discovery, unless ‘the person claiming defamation can demonstrate a

²³⁷ *Crazy Hotel*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5407*17, citing *Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004).

²³⁸ See *Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson*, 113 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (but the Supreme Court can determine whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard in conducting factual-sufficiency review).

²³⁹ *Ramsey*, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5554*3, citing *Pool v. Ford Motor Co.*, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g).

²⁴⁰ D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501-5505, enacted in 2010, effective in the District of Columbia on March 31, 2011.

²⁴¹ FED. R. CIV. P. 12.

²⁴² FED. R. CIV. P. 56.

²⁴³ *3M Co. v. Boulter*, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 102 (D. D.C. 2012). In this case, 3M sued U.K. defendants in federal court for blackmail, tortious interference, business disparagement, and related claims. The defendants filed motions to dismiss under the new D.C. anti-SLAPP statute.

²⁴⁴ *Id.* at *47.

²⁴⁵ *Id.*, citing *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 1437, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010), and FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

²⁴⁶ *Boulter*, 842 F.Supp. 2d at 95-96; *Shady Grove*, 130 S.Ct. at 1437.

²⁴⁷ See *Shady Grove*, 130 S.Ct. at 1437.

²⁴⁸ *Boulter*, 842 F.Supp. 2d at 89.

²⁴⁹ *Id.* at 102.

²⁵⁰ *Godin v. Schencks*, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010).

²⁵¹ *United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.*, 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999).

²⁵² *3M Co. v. Boulter*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40789*20 (D. D.C. March 22, 2013) (*Boulter II*).

²⁵³ *Id.*

likelihood of success on the merits.”²⁵⁴ The District Court found that “[t]his method of adjudicating, whereby the trial court weighs the evidence and dismisses a claim with prejudice that appears factually weak at the outset of the litigation, is alien to the federal courts.”²⁵⁵ The court believed that there “is no way to reconcile such a scheme with the Supreme Court’s explanation that ‘when a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.’”²⁵⁶ Importantly, the court found that “the Supreme Court has held that, even where a defendant asserts qualified immunity, lower courts cannot require plaintiffs to meet a heightened burden of proof to defeat summary judgment, in part because such a special procedural rule conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”²⁵⁷

Another very recent case raised significant questions about the applicability of the TCPA in federal court. A U.S. District Court sitting in eastern North Carolina reviewed the statute, but did not decide for conflicts of laws purposes whether a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss could be brought in federal court.²⁵⁸

This issue may prove to be fertile ground for disputes in federal courts, and may include more in-depth reviews of the various states’ anti-SLAPP laws to determine whether they are substantive or procedural. Based on the wording of the TCPA, the federal court practitioner should carefully consider whether to brave federal sanctions before bringing a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss.

I. Does the Act Conflict with the Supreme Court’s Rule-Making Authority?

Since the new statute creates new motion procedures that conflict with existing dispositive motions by rule, we should question whether it may violate the separation of powers between the Legislature and the rulemaking authority of the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court derives its rule-making authority initially from the Texas Constitution, which specifically and separately

empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of civil procedure.²⁵⁹ The Constitution authorized the Legislature to delegate to the Supreme Court other rulemaking power.²⁶⁰ The Supreme Court’s statutorily conveyed power is plenary, because the Rules of Practice Act provides: “[s]o that the Supreme Court has full rulemaking power in civil actions, a rule adopted by the Supreme Court repeals all conflicting laws and parts of laws governing practice and procedure in civil actions, but substantive law is not repealed.”²⁶¹ If, under the *Boulter* analysis, the Texas anti-SLAPP statute is procedural, it would seem to be subject to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.²⁶²

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure share a history of adoption similar to the Federal Rules. TEX. R. CIV. P. 2, adapted from FED. R. CIV. P. 1 in 1940, provides in pertinent part that “[t]hese rules shall govern the procedure in the justice, county, and district courts of the State of Texas in all actions of a civil nature, with such exceptions as may be hereinafter stated.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 1 provides:

The proper objective of rules of civil procedure is to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law. To the end that this objective may be attained with as great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense both to the litigants and to the state as may be practicable, these rules shall be given a liberal construction.

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have not been amended to provide any exceptions for the TCPA dismissal motion. Rule 2 makes no provision for such a statutory procedure to apply in lieu of the Rules of Procedure.

The Texas Supreme Court originally looked to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the adoption of the Texas summary judgment rule, TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a. The rule was adopted by order of October 12, 1949, effective March 1, 1950, and designated as the

²⁵⁴ *Boulter II*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40789*17-18.

²⁵⁵ *Boulter II*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40789*18.

²⁵⁶ *Boulter II*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40789*18, quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

²⁵⁷ *Boulter II*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40789*19, citing *Crawford-El v. Britton*, 523 U.S. 574, 594, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998).

²⁵⁸ *Ascend Health Corp. v. Wells*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35237* (E. D. N.C. March 14, 2013).

²⁵⁹ TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(b): “The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of civil procedure for all courts not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration of justice in the various courts.”

²⁶⁰ TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(c).

²⁶¹ TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.004(c). See also, Nathan L. Hecht & E. Lee Parsley, *Procedural Reform: Whence and Whither* (Sept. 1997).

²⁶² Unlike TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 9.003, the anti-SLAPP law contains no savings provision that it does not alter the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

new Rule 166-a.²⁶³ The Texas Bar Journal published the Texas Supreme Court's order adopting and amending several rules, which cited its source as "Federal Rule 56, as originally promulgated, except ...[with minor wording differences]."²⁶⁴

It is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly explore the issue of whether the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss is consistent with the Court's rule-making authority under the Texas Constitution, but this is a serious question to consider. It would certainly seem that at the very least, the Texas Supreme Court could, by order, repeal the motion procedure in Section 27.001 *et seq.*

J. Does the Statute Conflict With Texas' Constitutional Protection of Rights to Sue for Reputational Torts?

Since the Chapter 27 motion to dismiss is directed squarely at claims based on communications, at least many of which would be brought as reputational torts, there is a significant question whether the statute fatally conflicts with longstanding Texas law protecting the right to sue for reputational damages as guaranteed in the Texas Free Expression Clause.

The Texas Supreme Court very recently affirmed that "[t]he common law has long allowed a person to recover for damage to her reputation occasioned by the publication of false and defamatory statements."²⁶⁵ Justice Guzman's opinion thoughtfully referred to Chief Justice Rehnquist's note that Shakespeare "penned the rationale for the cause of action in Othello:

Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash;
'Tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to
thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.²⁶⁶

"Although we have recognized that the Texas Constitution's free speech guarantee is in some cases broader than the federal guarantee, we have also recognized that 'broader protection, if any, cannot

come at the expense of a defamation claimant's right to redress."²⁶⁷ "Unlike the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution twice expressly guarantees the right to bring reputational torts."²⁶⁸ The Texas Supreme Court declared that "[t]he Texas Constitution's free speech provision guarantees everyone the right to 'speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, *being responsible for abuse of that privilege*.'"²⁶⁹ In the *Turner* case, Chief Justice Phillips also relied upon the open courts provision: "the Texas Constitution's open courts provision guarantees that 'all courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person *or reputation*, shall have remedy by due course of law.'"²⁷⁰

We previously discussed the perils of the adoption of an undefined, and possibly higher, burden of proof than the general civil standard of preponderance of the evidence on the basis that a heightened standard of proof violates the Texas constitution's open courts provisions.²⁷¹ Beyond the issue of standards of proof, from a more basic statutory construction framework, the well-established case law supporting Texans' constitutional rights to seek redress for reputational damages provides ample reason for litigants to carefully review the use of a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss.

The recent *Neely* decision should be read closely, as it reviews and affirms defenses and privileges to defamation claims, and additional protections afforded to media defendants by the Texas Legislature, the United States Supreme Court, and the Texas Supreme Court.²⁷² Justice Guzman's opinion aptly notes that "we are reluctant to afford greater constitutional protection to members of the print and broadcast media than to ordinary citizens" because the "*First Amendment* affords equal dignity to freedom of speech and freedom of the press."²⁷³ Among the additional, special protections crafted for media defendants are a requirement that the plaintiff must prove the defamatory statements were false when made by a media defendant, along with

²⁶³ 12 TEX. B. J. 531 (1949); TEX. R. CIV. P. 166-a.

²⁶⁴ *Id.*

²⁶⁵ *Neely v. Wilson*, 2013 Tex. LEXIS 511 *11, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 766 (June 28, 2013), citing *Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.*, 497 U.S. 1, 11 (1990).

²⁶⁶ *Neely*, 2013 Tex. LEXIS 511*12, quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, *OTHELLO*, act 3 sc. 3, quoted in *Milkovich*, 497 U.S. at 12.

²⁶⁷ *Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc.*, 38 S.W.3d 103, 116-117 (Tex. 2000), (quoting *Casso v. Brand*, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989)).

²⁶⁸ *Neely*, 2013 Tex. LEXIS 511*12, *Turner*, 38 S.W.3d at 117 (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 13; *Casso*, 776 S.W.2d at 556; *Ex parte Tucci*, 859 S.W.2d 1, 19-23 (Tex. 1993) (Phillips, C.J., concurring)).

²⁶⁹ *Turner*, 38 S.W.3d at 117 (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added)).

²⁷⁰ *Turner*, 38 S.W.3d at 117 (citing TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (emphasis added)).

²⁷¹ *Supra*, Section III.D.3.ii.

²⁷² *Neely*, 2013 Tex. LEXIS 511*18-19.

²⁷³ *Id.*, quoting *Casso*, 776 S.W.2d at 554.

official/judicial proceedings privilege, the fair comment privilege, and a due care provision (without mentioning interlocutory appeals for certain media cases, and journalist's privilege in Chapter 22 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code). The Court even referenced the Defamation Mitigation Act²⁷⁴ as recent legislation that affects the ability of defamation plaintiffs to recover.²⁷⁵

Whether the *Neely* opinion can be interpreted as an opening for a constitutional challenge to the TCPA is an open question, but the careful practitioner should be mindful of this case when addressing Chapter 27 motions to dismiss.

IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES.

A. Overbroad Application and Chilling Effect on Meritorious Business Tort Actions.

Whether the lawsuit is actually frivolous is irrelevant to a motion to dismiss under the TCPA. While the Act was not enacted to legalize illegal activity, or to provide a safe harbor for violations of Texas law, it may have this unintended consequence.²⁷⁶

Abuse of anti-SLAPP statutes has been reported in other states, such as Maine and California.²⁷⁷ A Maine commentator reports that, “[n]ot surprisingly, entities are beginning to find ways to use anti-SLAPP statutes for less legitimate purposes. One example is the trend of corporate defendants’ use of special motions to dismiss under anti-SLAPP statutes as a delaying tactic in the face of legitimate consumer protection or product liability lawsuits.”²⁷⁸ “Absent a fee-shifting disincentive, defendants are filing largely futile special motions to dismiss and the engaging in interlocutory appeals of the inevitable denials of those motions.”²⁷⁹ Similarly, a California commentator reports that “legal seminars are continually encouraging corporations to employ the anti-SLAPP Statute motion as a new litigation weapon by filing it in otherwise ordinary personal injury and products

liability cases.”²⁸⁰ The authors understand that some counsel are urging entities involved any suits involving communications to file the motion to dismiss in each case.

Texas’ exemptions fall short of narrowing the application of the TCPA to true SLAPP cases, particularly since there is no requirement that there be a finding that the lawsuit was frivolous, and that there is a gross disparity in resources among the litigants in which the alleged defamer is at a disadvantage.

Moreover, certain causes of action can always be categorized as “relating to” or “based on” speech, particularly common law torts of defamation, disparagement, tortious interference, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and even statutory claims concerning communications and misrepresentations.

For example, the Texas Election Code provides that candidates and officeholders who are the objects of illegal campaign contributions have the right to seek damages against the person or persons who knowingly violate the Code.²⁸¹ The Code also provides that “[a] person who is being harmed or is in danger of being harmed by a violation or threatened violation of this code is entitled to appropriate injunctive relief to prevent the violation from continuing or occurring.”²⁸² Thus, a candidate or officeholder who is harmed by illegal contributions can sue for damages and injunctive relief. But campaign contributions necessarily “relate to” or are “based on” the “exercise of free speech.”²⁸³ As a result of the enactment of the TCPA, any political candidates suing for damages and to enjoin violations the Code must be ready to survive an anti-SLAPP motion.

A critical problem with determining the applicability of the statute is the use of the terms “related to” and “based on.” What does “related to” mean? Does it mean more than “is engaged in?” Or more than “arising from?” As drafted, the statute conceivably applies to almost any type of dispute between parties, and is not limited to traditional press communications, or communications with governmental entities. The very low threshold for success in a motion to dismiss means that anytime a

²⁷⁴ Discussed at length in Section VI, *infra*.

²⁷⁵ *Neely*, 2013 Tex. LEXIS 511*21.

²⁷⁶ The Act became effective on June 17, 2011 and there is no case law interpreting it or applying it. Under the Code Construction Act, it is proper to consider legislative history and the object sought to be obtained by the Legislature when construing and applying any statute. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.023.

²⁷⁷ John G. Osborn & Jeffrey A. Thaler, *Feature: Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Law: Special Protection Against Improper Lawsuits Targeting Free Speech and Petitioning*, 23 MAINE BAR J. 32 (2008).

²⁷⁸ *Id.*

²⁷⁹ *Id.*

²⁸⁰ Joshua L. Baker, *Review of Selected 2003 California Legislation: Civil: Chapter 338: Another New Law, Another SLAPP in the Face of California Business*, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 409 (2004).

²⁸¹ TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.131(a) (2010).

²⁸² TEX. ELEC. CODE § 273.081.

²⁸³ Whether campaign contributions are actually considered constitutionally protected free speech is a question beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is fair to say that campaign contributions are always necessarily *related* to the exercise of free speech.

blogger, or other person, decides that he is going to make a business' life miserable, he can do so with virtual impunity so long as he claims he is exercising his First Amendment rights. If a person repeatedly writes or emails vitriolic views about a business, in a way that is damaging to the business, is it not proper to sue to stop the damage? If a person's website, or Face book, or Twitter comments otherwise violate state defamation law, why shouldn't a party sue for such conduct? We can easily see that theft of confidential information, trade secrets, statutory actions, other misappropriation actions, can be the subject of anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss. It is a very simple matter to predict that creative lawyers will invoke the TCPA's provisions in virtually every applicable case.

Suits for business disparagement, tortious interference, defamation, and related torts are a staple of tactics to restrain unethical practices, and to restrain persons with defective moral compasses from engaging in deleterious behavior. The tort system generally works well to temper the bad conduct of businesses, customers, and the public. The vast majority of business tort suits would likely not be characterized as frivolous SLAPP suits. As a practical matter, most people do not want to spend the money to prosecute a meritless case. The medicine is probably worse than the illness sought to be cured.

B. Justice Delayed is Justice Denied.

Doubtless many litigants in business tort suits will try out the new TCPA. For a defendant, such as the disparaging blogger, or illegal advertiser, to promptly file a motion to dismiss, with an affidavit claiming that the activity was protected, is not a difficult matter. That defendant/movant would know that he is not likely subject to sanctions under the statute, and that filing the motion causes the case to grind to a halt, the discovery stops, and the plaintiff/respondent has to defend without the benefit of even basic discovery. In many cases a plaintiff does not have the specific proof on every element of her cause of action, and will be able to prove the case with some evidence from the target defendant. That opportunity is denied in the process of the expedited motion to dismiss.

By the time that an expedited appeal is decided, precious time is lost and the expense of meritorious litigation mounts. We will leave it up to the reader to determine the probability of a plaintiff securing fees and expenses from the defendant/movant in such litigation in response to the motion to dismiss.

We will also leave it up to the reader to determine whether the statute in fact operates to deter frivolous SLAPP suits, or has cast the net so far as to ensnare a much greater class of cases in which the

parties need access to the courts to resolve their disputes.

C. When the Texas Attorney General Must be Invited to the Party.

The passage of the TCPA also reflects a lack of consideration about the interaction of the statute with other statutory notice requirements. Since the communications made the basis of the motion to dismiss are likely claimed to be constitutionally protected, if the suit is based at least in part on statutory grounds that the movant challenges on constitutional grounds, the state Attorney General must be timely notified and given an opportunity to participate. Similarly, if a respondent challenges a motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds, notice must be timely provided to the Texas Attorney General.

Pursuant to Section 402.010 of the Texas Government Code (new 2011 statute), the Texas Attorney General must be notified before any ruling by the trial court is made under Chapter 27. Such statute provides that the Texas Attorney General *must* be notified of any challenge to the constitutionality of a Texas statute, whether such challenge be by "petition, motion or other pleading," and 45-days' notice required.²⁸⁴ Also, pursuant to Section 37.006 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, in a declaratory judgment action, when the constitutionality of a Texas statute is drawn into question, the Texas Attorney General "*must* be served with a copy of the proceeding and is entitled to be heard."²⁸⁵

The difficulty lies in the expedited nature of the hearing on the motion to dismiss. How can there be a hearing within 30 days of the filing of the motion to dismiss, and at the same time serve notice on the Attorney General and allow the Attorney General's participation? The trial court that finds a statute unconstitutional, whether as applied or facially, runs the risk of having the ruling overturned as void if the Attorney General has insufficient notice. Once a challenge to the constitutionality of the TCPA and the Chapter 27 motion to dismiss are made, how does an appellate court review the trial court's denial of the motion by order or operation of law?

The practitioner is encouraged to promptly explore appropriate motions and notices to the trial court and Texas Attorney General in the event that the subject matter of the dispute becomes a matter of concern to the Attorney General.

²⁸⁴ TEX. GOV'T CODE § 402.010 (new 2011 statute) (2012).

²⁸⁵ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. Code § 37.006.

V. THE TCPA – CONCLUSIONS DRAWN.

While the objective of protecting First Amendment rights in the age of the internet is laudable, and conscientious lawyers are mindful of the need to pursue meritorious litigation, the TCPA has a number of flaws that may likely restrain the filing of legitimate suits, rather than restrict frivolous cases. The TCPA includes many flaws and inconsistencies that can serve as trial and appeal traps for the unwary lawyer. Since the TCPA clearly encompasses far more than SLAPP cases, practitioners should thoroughly examine this new law's applications and defenses in a wide variety of cases. Business and constitutional tort lawyers should carefully review the statute and prepare for litigating it before making claims relating to communications made about... well, just about anything at all.

VI. THE “MULLIGAN BILL”: THE TEXAS DEFAMATION MITIGATION ACT.

Our discussion of the TCPA would be incomplete without a very brief overview of another law affecting reputation tort litigation, the Defamation Mitigation Act, popularly known as the “Mulligan Bill.” H.B. 1759 added a new subchapter B to Chapter 73 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, to impose significant pre-suit conditions on defamation lawsuit filings and limitation of some damages.

A. Legislative History.

On February 25, 2013, Rep. Todd Hunter filed H.B. 1759, “relating to a correction, clarification, or retraction of incorrect information published.”²⁸⁶ The bill, referred to as the Defamation Mitigation Act, was “based on uniform legislation adopted by the Uniform Law Commission . . . to encourage the prompt and thorough correction, clarification, or retraction of published information that is alleged to be defamatory and to provide for the early resolution of disputes arising from such a publication.”²⁸⁷ H.B. 1759 required a “timely and sufficient” request for a correction, clarification, or retraction of published material in order to maintain a defamation claim.

Governor Perry signed the bill into law, effective immediately, on June 14, 2013. The legislative history of H.B. 1759 indicates that primarily media representatives advocated for its passage though the stated purpose of the legislation is “to provide a method for a person who has been defamed by a

publication or broadcast to mitigate any perceived damage or injury.”²⁸⁸

The bill was referred to the Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Committee, which heard testimony in favor of the bill on April 1, 2013.²⁸⁹ Rep. Hunter introduced the bill, and then Judge David Peeples (on behalf of his self), Brad Parker (on behalf of the Texas Trial Lawyers Association), Jerry Martin (on behalf of KPRC-TV and the Texas Association of Broadcasters), Shane Fitzgerald (on behalf of the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas), Debbie Hiott (on behalf of herself, the Austin American-Statesman, and Texas Press Association), and Laura Prather (on behalf of herself, the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas, Texas Press Association, and Texas Association of Broadcasters) testified with all testifying in favor of the bill except Parker, who testified on the bill.

Peeples gave three points in support of the bill. First, he said defamation is different from other types of injuries because it can be corrected, retracted, or clarified “and much of the damage can be undone.” Second, Peeples testified that H.B. 1759 encourages such repair by implementing a set of procedures to encourage retractions, clarifications, or corrections. Finally, Peeples testified the bill would promote early closure of lawsuits.²⁹⁰

Parker countered Peeples’ testimony by describing defamation as “one of the most damaging injuries [one] can suffer.” He testified regarding his concerns about the bill, as it was written, in that it created a “precondition to a lawsuit” and the retraction process could possibly be used later in an evidentiary manner. “We don’t want to create too much of a retraction process that it creates a black hole,” said Parker. “An abatement black hole, if you will, that it is so tedious to comply with the retraction issues that we . . . just never get out of it.”²⁹¹

Martin testified he supports the bill because it would provide a framework and timeframe to mitigate any issues, noting for the media it is “almost

²⁸⁸ See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.052 (2013).

²⁸⁹ The video recording of testimony before the Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence Comm. regarding Tex. H.B. 2935 also contains Tex. H.B. 1759 testimony, which begins at 1:41:10 and ends at 2:04:14.

²⁹⁰ See *Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1759 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence* at 1:43:01, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013), available at <http://www.house.state.tx.us/video-audio/committee-broadcasts/committee-archives/player/?session=83&committee=330&ram=13040114330> (testimony of David Peeples on behalf of his self).

²⁹¹ See *id.* at 1:45:01 (testimony of Brad Parker on behalf of the Texas Trial Lawyers Association).

²⁸⁶ Tex. H.B. 1759, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).

²⁸⁷ See H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, *Bill Analysis*, TEX. H.B. 1759, 83d Leg., R.S., No. 83R 23145, at 1 (Tex. 2013), available at <http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/analysis/pdf/HB01759H.pdf#navpanes=0>.

impossible to get everything right, every single day, every single year.”²⁹²

Fitzgerald testified, “This law provides incentive for the media to make corrective action quickly and in a timely manner. The law also provides incentive for those who feel they’ve been wronged to come forward instead of just filing suit.”²⁹³

Hiott echoed the testimony of both Martin and Fitzgerald stating, “Good journalists really do everything they can to avoid a mistake, but when they do make a mistake, they want to correct the record quickly for the credibility of the paper, but also for their own credibility with their sources as journalists. That’s hard to do when the subject of an error fails to inform a publication of a problem, and even more frustrating if those subjects go straight to the courts in search of a financial answer rather than a correction.”²⁹⁴

Prather testified Texas was among a minority of states that did not have a retraction statute, noting statutes dating back as far as 1882 are in force in 38 other states. Prather testified the bill would provide a “cooling off period” and encourage a “prompt restoration of reputation,” rather than a lengthy and contentious lawsuit. Based on a question a Committee member asked regarding cases involving actual malice, Prather stated the bill would not allow one to “retract around actual malice,” meaning if the defamation is based in actual malice, then a retraction would not block the defamed party from filing a lawsuit and seeking exemplary damages. Furthermore, in response to a question regarding whether the bill was directed toward only the media and public figures, Prather testified the uniform law from which H.B. 1759 was based applied to all types of publications, media or non-media generated, and all individuals—both public and private figures.²⁹⁵

The Committee revised the bill, adding an abatement section that outlines a procedure for publishers to file a plea in abatement if a written request for a correction, clarification, or retraction is not received.²⁹⁶

²⁹² See *id.* at 1:51:09 (testimony of Jerry Martin on behalf of KPRC-TV and the Texas Association of Broadcasters).

²⁹³ See *id.* at 1:52:30 (testimony of Shane Fitzgerald on behalf of the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas).

²⁹⁴ See *id.* at 1:55:13 (testimony of Debbie Hiott on behalf of herself, the Austin American-Statesman, and Texas Press Association).

²⁹⁵ See *id.* at 1:57:28 (testimony of Laura Prather on behalf of herself, the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas, Texas Press Association, and Texas Association of Broadcasters).

²⁹⁶ See H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, *Bill Analysis*, TEX. H.B. 1759, 83d Leg., R.S., No. 83R 23145, at 6 (Tex. 2013), available at

In a 145-0-2 vote, the House passed H.B. 1759 on May 2, 2013. In the Senate, the bill was referred to the Committee on State Affairs, which heard testimony on May 13, 2013.²⁹⁷ Senator Rodney Ellis introduced the bill, and then Patti Smith (on behalf of KVUE-TV, Belo Corporation, and the Texas Association of Broadcasters) and Jeff Cohen (on behalf of the *Houston Chronicle*, Hearst Newspapers, and the Texas Press Association) testified in favor of the bill. Smith said, “We’re in favor of house bill 1759 because it establishes that framework for prompt resolution of disputes. It does not let a broadcaster or publisher off the hook for libel.”²⁹⁸ Cohen testified about the media’s desire to correct mistakes quickly, and he emphasized that similar legislation has worked well in other states. Laura Prather was in attendance as a resource witness, but did not testify.²⁹⁹

The Senate amended the plea in abatement portion of H.B. 1759 to allow an abatement to continue beyond 60 days after a written request is served if agreed to by the parties.³⁰⁰

B. Application of the Defamation Mitigation Act: Prerequisites to Filing Defamation Suit, Request and Response, Abatement.

The Act establishes a timely and sufficient demand for correction, clarification, or retraction as a prerequisite to filing an action for defamation by a natural person or an organization.³⁰¹ A request for correction, clarification, or retraction is timely if made within the limitations period for defamation.³⁰²

What constitutes a “sufficient” request? Section 73.055 (d) sets out five specific requirements, which

<http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/analysis/pdf/HB01759H.pdf#navpanes=0>.

²⁹⁷ A video recording of the testimony is available for viewing at <http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/commit/c570/c570.htm>. Click on the “Part I” link next to May 13, 2013. Testimony relating to Tex. H.B. 1759 begins 9:00 minutes into the recording and ends at 17:44.

²⁹⁸ See *Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1795 Before the Sen. Comm. on State Affairs* at 00:10:50, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013), available at <http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/commit/c570/c570.htm> (testimony of Patti Smith on behalf of KVUE-TV, Belo Corporation, and the Texas Association of Broadcasters).

²⁹⁹ See *id.* at 00:13:58.

³⁰⁰ Sen. Amendments Section-by-Section Analysis, TEX. H.B. 1759, 83d Leg., R.S., No. 13.140.359, at 7 (Tex. 2013), available at <http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/senateamendana/pdf/HB01759A.pdf#navpanes=0>.

³⁰¹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.055(a); “person” defined at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.053.

³⁰² TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.055(b).

include being served on the publisher, made in writing and signed, describes with particularity the statement, alleges the defamatory meaning or specifies the circumstances causing a defamatory meaning of the statement.³⁰³

How does the alleged wrongdoer respond? First, the respondent can ask the person making the retraction request for information about the falsity of the alleged defamatory statement not later than 30 days after receiving the retraction request.³⁰⁴

What retraction is sufficient and timely? The statute offers no easy definitions or solutions, but a retraction is timely if made within 30 days after receipt of the demand.³⁰⁵ The retraction is sufficient if generally published in the same manner as the original publication in a manner and medium reasonably likely to reach substantially the same audience as the original objectionable publication, and (1) acknowledges that the prior statement is erroneous; (2) is an allegation that the defamatory meaning arises from other than the express language of the publication and the publisher disclaims an intent to communicate that meaning or to assert its truth; (3) is a statement attributed to another person whom the publisher identifies and the publisher disclaims an intent to assert the truth of the statement; or (4) is publication of the requestor's statement of the facts, as set forth in a request for correction, clarification, or retraction, or a fair summary of the statement, exclusive of any portion that is defamatory of another, obscene, or otherwise improper for publication.³⁰⁶

The new statute goes on to deal more specifically with two or more statements as defamatory,³⁰⁷ describe how the retraction is published with sufficient prominence,³⁰⁸ and internet publication.³⁰⁹

There are additional procedures for a defendant in a lawsuit to disclose intention to rely on a retraction,³¹⁰ and for a plaintiff to challenge the timeliness of a retraction.³¹¹

Determination of the sufficiency of demands and responses for retracting are a question of law, and the trial court "shall" make a ruling "at the earliest appropriate time before trial."³¹²

The request for retraction, and response, are not admissible at trial, but that fact of such request and

response may be admissible in mitigation of damages under Section 73.003(a)(3).³¹³

In a procedure similar to abatements under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices – Consumer Protection Act,³¹⁴ the Defamation Mitigation Act also permits a defamation defendant who did not timely receive a written request for retraction to file a plea in abatement within 30 days after answering the suit.³¹⁵ The suit is automatically abated in its entirety beginning 11 days after the plea in abatement is filed if the plea is verified and not controverted by affidavit of the plaintiff before the 11th day.³¹⁶ If abated, the abatement continues until 60 days after the date the written request is served, or some later date as agreed.³¹⁷ If the plea is controverted, a hearing on the plea in abatement "will take place as soon as practical considering the court's docket."³¹⁸ All statutory and judicial deadlines under the Rules of Procedure relating to an abated suit are stayed during the pendency of the abatement.³¹⁹

C. Limitations of Damages.

In order to be able to recover exemplary damages, the plaintiff must make the demand for retraction within 90 days of receiving knowledge of the offending publication.³²⁰ If the plaintiff fails to disclose the alleged falsity, the plaintiff cannot recover exemplary damages unless the publication was made with actual malice.³²¹

Exemplary damages are not recoverable if the retraction is sufficient and timely, unless the publication was made with actual malice.³²² The statute does not make provision for any limitation of actual damages.

D. Harmonizing (or Conflicting) With Texas Citizens Participation Act.

It is unclear whether the abatement provided for in Section 73.062 applies to motions to dismiss under the TCPA. It is more than conceivable that a Chapter 27 motion to dismiss that must be brought within 60 days of service of a defamation suit will conflict with a plea in abatement brought within 30 days of filing an answer, since both statutes address the same types of causes of action. There are no provisions in either statute that address the other. There are no provisions

³⁰³ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.055(d).

³⁰⁴ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.056(a).

³⁰⁵ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.057(a).

³⁰⁶ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.057(b).

³⁰⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.057(c).

³⁰⁸ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.057(d).

³⁰⁹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.057(e).

³¹⁰ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.058(a).

³¹¹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.058(b).

³¹² TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.058(d).

³¹³ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.061(a,b).

³¹⁴ TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §17.01 et seq.

³¹⁵ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.062(a).

³¹⁶ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.062(b).

³¹⁷ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.062(c).

³¹⁸ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.062(c).

³¹⁹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.062(d).

³²⁰ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.055(c).

³²¹ TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.056(b).

³²² TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §73.059.

in the TCPA that allow for an extension of any deadlines in the event that the defendant also avails itself of the abatement procedure under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §73.062. It is arguable that Section 73.062(d)'s statement that "all statutory and judicial deadlines under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure relating to a suit abated ..." does not apply to motions to dismiss brought under Chapter 27.

A defendant who is sued for a reputational tort may have to face a choice about whether to abate the action or file a motion to dismiss and waive the benefits of Chapter 73 abatement.

As usual, there are sufficient issues and inconsistencies in the new legislation affecting reputation injury suits to keep litigators busy for quite some time, and will likely result in additional legislation in the next legislative session in 2015.

No. D-1-GN-14-004290

Don Zimmerman,
Plaintiff,

vs.

**Austin Investigative Reporting Project
d/b/a The Austin Bulldog, and Ken
Martin;**
Defendants.

In the 53rd District Court
Travis County, Texas

Affidavit of Don Zimmerman

Affiant, Donald Zimmerman, makes the following affidavit.

1. My name is Donald Zimmerman.
2. I am a Texas resident, over 18 years of age, and have personal knowledge of the facts in this affidavit.
3. All of the facts in my Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
4. As a result of this defamation, the Austin Chronicle has been running stories on this case even after the election has ended.
5. Multiple people have come up to me and questioned me with the impression that I am a child abuser. I have had to expend time and effort rebuilding my reputation.
6. The legal matters in my family law case were dormant for years prior to the case being resolved with a final legal order. By the Defendants' actions, it has reignited this legal matter that was old and essentially resolved.
7. People opposed to my political views, who were friends of mine and who were helping in my campaign, were approached by my former political opponent's supporters and given the article with the challenge not to support a child abuser. This again has harmed my reputation and has taken time and effort to rebuild those relationships with the truth.

8. I have no further statements.

Donald Zimmerman
Donald Zimmerman

VERIFICATION

Before me, on this day, January 2, 2015, appeared Donald Zimmerman, who identified himself by personal identification and affirmed the foregoing affidavit under penalty of perjury before me the undersigned notary public.

K Bagwell
Notary Public, State of Texas



Opponents taking article and shopping it around.

State of Texas
County of Williamson
Sworn to and subscribed before me on
the 2nd day of January, 2015
K Bagwell
Notary Public's Signature
My Commission Expires 01/02/18